NAME

  I_A_RFC2409_5 - [Initiator Test] Position of payload

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  I_A_RFC2409_5.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_A_RFC2409_5.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

Network Topology

        HOST-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                        
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:initiator
  

  XXXX: EUI64 address

Verification Points


       The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange.

Configuration

       Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
          
          
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
                       
                       
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
          
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Transport            
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            any            
             
             
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            any
          
          
        
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

Pre-Sequence

       In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


 * PHASE I


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.

JUDGEMENT

       The first message which has correct position of payload must be received       
       (The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads).
       And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2409 


   (omit)


   The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange.
   Except where otherwise noted, there are no requirements for ISAKMP
   payloads in any message to be in any particular order.


   (omit)