NAME

  I_A_RFC3602_5_1 - [Initiator Test] Transform payload SA Attributes check (AES(128bit))

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_A_RFC3602_5_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option

 See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

Network Topology

        HOST-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                        
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:initiator
  

  XXXX: EUI64 address

Verification Points

IKE implementations SHOULD support the following attribute values

Parameter Value

ISAKMP SA Attributes - AES-128 in CBC mode
- SHA
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over group number two.

So, IKE implementations SHOULD support AES.

Configuration

       Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
(It is shown that the mark of "*" permits anythings as attributes.)
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
          
          
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
                       
                       
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg 
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
          
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
            IKE-TEST                               
            AES           
            SHA*           
            pre-shared key*           
            2*           
            8 Hour            
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP 
            ESP_3DES          
            Transport            
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour            
            any            
             
             
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST      
            AES
            SHA*
            pre-shared key*           
            2*           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA
            8 Hour 
            any
          
          
        
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

Pre-Sequence

       In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
                       Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.

JUDGEMENT

     The first message Attributes(AES-CBC:7) must be included.
     And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC3602 
  5.  IKE Interactions


  5.1.  Phase 1 Identifier


   For Phase 1 negotiations, IANA has assigned an Encryption Algorithm
   ID of 7 for AES-CBC.




Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)
draft-hoffman-ikev1-algorithms-02.txt
3.  New algorithm requirements


   The new requirements for IKEv1 are:


   o  TripleDES for encryption MUST be supported
   o  AES-128 in CBC mode [RFC3602] SHOULD be supported
   o  SHA-1 for hashing and HMAC functions MUST be supported
   o  Pre-shared secrets for authentication MUST be supported
   o  AES-128 in CBC mode for HMAC functions ([RFC3566] and [RFC3664])
      SHOULD be supported
   o  Diffie-Hellman MODP group 2 (discrete log 1024 bits) MUST be
      supported
   o  Diffie-Hellman MODP group 14 (discrete log 2048 bits) [RFC3526]
      SHOULD be supported
   o  RSA for authentication with signatures SHOULD be supported


   The other algorithms that were listed at MUST-level and SHOULD-level
   in RFC 2409 are now MAY-level.  This includes DES for encryption, MD5
   and Tiger for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1, Diffie-Hellman
   MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for authentication with
   signatures, and RSA for authentication with encryption.  DES for
   encryption, MD5 for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1 are dropped
   to MAY due to cryptographic weakness.  Tiger for hashing,
   Diffie-Hellman MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for
   authentication with signatures, and RSA for authentication with
   encryption are dropped due to lack of any significant deployment and
   interoperability.

Parameter		Value
ISAKMP	SA Attributes	- AES-128 in CBC mode - SHA - Authentication via pre-shared keys. - MODP over group number two.