#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 # Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/ENODE/I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq,v 1.17.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:41 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq,v 1.17.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:41 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(host, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => 'aes', 'isakmp_enc_key_length' => '128', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Transport', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); ikeSetAddr($IF0); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); vClear($IF0); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my %ret2 = ikeSend2TN('Link0', 5, 0, 2, 1, \%ikeConfig); my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; #None my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret = ikePh1Recv_agg('Link0', 10, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); ##################### # Enc Alg check ###################### my $atttype = 1; my $attvalue = $IKE::isakmp_encryption_algorithm_value{$ikeConfig{'isakmp_enc_alg'}}; my $attret = &IKE_check::SpecificAttributeCheckFromSeq(\%ret,$atttype,$attvalue,1); if($attret < 0){ $ret{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL } if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } vLogHTML("Transform payload SA Attributes (AES(128bit)) is correct
"); vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); vStop($IF0); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME I_A_RFC3602_5_1 - [Initiator Test] Transform payload SA Attributes check (AES(128bit)) =head1 TARGET End-Node =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html
  I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_A_RFC3602_5_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
  •         HOST-2(TN):responder
              |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
              |                        
    Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                       |
                       |
                     ROUTER-1(TN)
                       |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                       |
    Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
              |
              |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
            NUT:initiator
      
    XXXX: EUI64 address

  • Verification Points
      IKE implementations SHOULD support the following attribute values
      Parameter Value
      ISAKMP SA Attributes - AES-128 in CBC mode
      - SHA
      - Authentication via pre-shared keys.
      - MODP over group number two.
      So, IKE implementations SHOULD support AES.
  • Configuration
    •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
    • (It is shown that the mark of "*" permits anythings as attributes.) At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
      Machine Src Dest Phase I Phase II
      Ex mode Key Value Enc Alg Hash Alg Auth Method DH Group PH1 Lt IDx

      Proto ID Trans ID Mode Auth Alg PH2 Lt Upper
      NUT NUT addr HOST-2 addr Aggressive IKE-TEST AES SHA* pre-shared key* 2* 8 Hour NUT addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Transport HMAC-SHA 8 Hour any
      HOST-2 HOST-2 addr NUT addr Aggressive IKE-TEST AES SHA* pre-shared key* 2* 8 Hour HOST-2 addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Transport HMAC-SHA 8 Hour any
      *Ex Mode = Exchange mode *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx) *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm *Key Value = pre-shared key value *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier *Trans ID = Transform Identifier *Mode = Encapsulation Mode *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm *Auth Method = Authentication Method *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol *NUT addr = NUT address *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

  • Pre-Sequence
  •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
           NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
    	   
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html
  This test check is following.

AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) (1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========> Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator transmits identification information.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The first message Attributes(AES-CBC:7) must be included. And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html
  RFC3602 
  5.  IKE Interactions

5.1. Phase 1 Identifier
For Phase 1 negotiations, IANA has assigned an Encryption Algorithm ID of 7 for AES-CBC.

Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1) draft-hoffman-ikev1-algorithms-02.txt 3. New algorithm requirements
The new requirements for IKEv1 are:
o TripleDES for encryption MUST be supported o AES-128 in CBC mode [RFC3602] SHOULD be supported o SHA-1 for hashing and HMAC functions MUST be supported o Pre-shared secrets for authentication MUST be supported o AES-128 in CBC mode for HMAC functions ([RFC3566] and [RFC3664]) SHOULD be supported o Diffie-Hellman MODP group 2 (discrete log 1024 bits) MUST be supported o Diffie-Hellman MODP group 14 (discrete log 2048 bits) [RFC3526] SHOULD be supported o RSA for authentication with signatures SHOULD be supported
The other algorithms that were listed at MUST-level and SHOULD-level in RFC 2409 are now MAY-level. This includes DES for encryption, MD5 and Tiger for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1, Diffie-Hellman MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for authentication with signatures, and RSA for authentication with encryption. DES for encryption, MD5 for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1 are dropped to MAY due to cryptographic weakness. Tiger for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for authentication with signatures, and RSA for authentication with encryption are dropped due to lack of any significant deployment and interoperability.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut