#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 # Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/ENODE/I_RFC2408_5_3_2_P2_2_GENERIC.seq,v 1.43.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:44 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: I_RFC2408_5_3_2_P2_2_GENERIC.seq,v 1.43.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:44 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(host, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Transport', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', 'ipsec_p_send_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p_send_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_p_select_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p_select_mode' => 'Transport', ); #====== set TN's cookie and nonce ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; my $nonce1 = '00000000000000000000000000000001'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'} = $nonce; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_r'} = $nonce1; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'} = 4096; vLogHTML("CKY-R: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("ISAKMP Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("IPsec Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("responder SPI : $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); ikeSetAddr($IF0); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); my %ret2 = ikePh2PreSeqI($IF0,$cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig); my %phase1_keep=%ret2; #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase start ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret = ikePh2Recv($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); $cpp = ' -DINVALID_PHASE2_SEND_2ND_SA '; %ret2 = ikePh2Send2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } if($IKE::NOTIFY_CHECK eq undef){ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(8); #Hash payload $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret = ikePh2Recv3rd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::PASS) { vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("NG:Phase-2 3rd message is returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); }else{ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("OK:Phase-2 3rd message is not returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); } }else{ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 Notify recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX'}, $IKE::notify_messages{'PAYLOAD-MALFORMED'}); my $encryptiontype= '1'; $cpp = "-DPACKET_ISAKMP_PHASE2_DEF "; $cpp .= $ikeConfig{'cpp_phase2_recv'}; %pktdesc = ( %pktdesc, 'isakmp_phase2_recv' => 'Recv 1st message from HOST1(NUT)' ); @ike = ( @ike, 'isakmp_phase2_recv' ); %ret = ikeRecvNotify($IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, \@ike, \%phase1_keep, \%ikeConfig,\@notifyMessageID,$encryptiontype); if($ret{'status'} >= 2) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME I_RFC2408_5_3_2_P2_2_GENERIC - [Initiator Test] Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero =head1 TARGET End-Node =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  I_RFC2408_5_3_2_P2_2_GENERIC.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC2408_5_3_2_P2_2_GENERIC.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •         HOST-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                        
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:initiator
  
    
  XXXX: EUI64 address

  • Verification Points

         Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero.  If the value
     in the RESERVED field is not zero, the message is discarded and
     the following actions are taken: 
    
       (a)  The event, INVALID RESERVED FIELD, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file. 
    
       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED
            message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity.  This
            action is dictated by a system security policy.

  • Configuration

      •        
    • SA Payload Format(HOST-2:Responder,In Phase II)
      • 
          RESERVED field : 1(set to not zero,invalid value)
      
       
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Main  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Transport            
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            any            
          
         
          
         
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Main
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

  • Pre-Sequence

    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


 * PHASE I


Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.



           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; HASH_R


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Send the fourth message from TN
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function). 


   6. Send the sixth message from TN
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).



                        AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #     Initiator(NUT)   Direction      Responder(TN)      NOTE
(1)  HDR; SA; KE;      =>                        Begin ISAKMP-SA or
                                                 Proxy negotiation
     NONCE; IDii                                 and Key Exchange


(2)                    <=     HDR; SA; KE;
                              NONCE; IDir; AUTH
                                                 Initiator Identity
                                                 Verified by Responder
                                                 Key Generated
                                                 Basic SA agreed upon


(3)  HDR*; AUTH        =>
                                                 Responder Identity
                                                 Verified by Initiator
                                                 SA established


   1. Recieve the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).  There
      can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e.  no choices)
      in order for the aggressive exchange to work.  Keying material used
      to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
      used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
      also transmitted.  Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
      be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
      participation in the exchange.  Additionally, the initiator transmits
      identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads.  Keying material used to arrive at a common
      shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
      liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
      Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
      authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
      the exchange.  Additionally, the responder transmits identification
      information.  All of this information is transmitted under the
      protection of the agreed upon authentication function.  Local
      security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
      protection suite is accepted.  One possible action is the
      transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
      Exchange.


   3. Recieve the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
      agreed upon authentication function.  This information is transmitted
      under the protection of the common shared secret.  Local security
      policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
      One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
      of an Informational Exchange.



  The test sequence is following.


 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
           SA, Ni       ========>


(2)                     <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr <-----RESERVED field : 1(invalid)


(3-A)HDR*, HASH(3)      ========> X                         <-----Must not transmit
         or
(3-B)HDR*, HASH(1), N/D ========>
                        Judgement


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third message (3-B), the initiator indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly. In Phase II , the second message must not be accepted. And the third message(3-A) must not be returned (* or BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED message(3-B) is returned). *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2408
  5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing


  (omit)


   When any of the ISAKMP Payloads are received, the receiving entity
   (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Check the Next Payload field to confirm it is valid.  If the Next
       Payload field validation fails, the message is discarded and the
       following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID NEXT PAYLOAD, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   2.  Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero.  If the value
       in the RESERVED field is not zero, the message is discarded and
       the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID RESERVED FIELD, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED
            message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity.  This
            action is dictated by a system security policy.


   3.  Process the remaining payloads as defined by the Next Payload
       field.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut