NAME

  R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG - [Responder Test] Invalid Signature Payload Format(Signature Data field value is incorrect) check

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, SIG_R


(3)  HDR[*]; SIG_I         ========>                                    <---Signature Data field : 0(invalid)


(4)                        <========       HDR; N/D  
                        Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the signed data, SIG_I is 
      the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_I.


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the signed data, SIG_R 
      is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_R.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the second message (4), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.




 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
           SA, Ni       ========>


(2)                   X <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr         <-----Must not transmit
                Judgement (Check *2)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.

JUDGEMENT

      In AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE, the first to the second message must be exchanged correctly.
      The third message must not be accepted.
      And must not establish ISAKMP SA(In QUICK MODE, the second message must not transmit(Check *2)
      (* or AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message(4) may be returned(Check *1)).)
      *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.12 Signature Payload Processing


(omit)


   When a Signature payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine if the Signature is supported.  If the Signature
       determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
       actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in
            the appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to
            the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   2.  Perform the Signature function as outlined in the DOI and/or Key
       Exchange protocol documents.  If the Signature function fails,
       the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID SIGNATURE VALUE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message type MAY be
            sent to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by
            a system security policy.

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility