#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 # Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq,v 1.16.2.3 2005/11/22 10:06:02 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq,v 1.16.2.3 2005/11/22 10:06:02 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; my $IF1 = Link1; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => 'aes', 'isakmp_enc_key_length' => '128', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; my $ret0 = packetSendOnly($IF1, 'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); if($ret0 == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; #None my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret = ikePh1Recv_agg('Link0', 10, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); ##################### # Enc Alg check ###################### my $atttype = 1; my $attvalue = $IKE::isakmp_encryption_algorithm_value{$ikeConfig{'isakmp_enc_alg'}}; my $attret = &IKE_check::SpecificAttributeCheckFromSeq(\%ret,$atttype,$attvalue,1); if($attret < 0){ $ret{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL } if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } vLogHTML("Transform payload SA Attributes (AES-128) is correct
"); vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_I_A_RFC3602_5_1 - [Initiator Test] Transform payload SA Attributes check (AES-128) =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_I_A_RFC3602_5_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC3602_5_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option

 See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points
      IKE implementations SHOULD support the following attribute values
      Parameter Value
      ISAKMP SA Attributes - AES-128 in CBC mode
      - MD5
      - Authentication via pre-shared keys.
      - MODP over default group number one.
      So, IKE implementations SHOULD support AES.

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
(It is shown that the mark of "*" permits anythings as attributes.)
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg 
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
            IKE-TEST                               
            AES           
            SHA*           
            pre-shared key*           
            2*           
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES            
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour            
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any            
          
         
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST      
            AES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP 
            ESP_3DES   
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA
            8 Hour 
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address

  • Pre-Sequence
    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The first message Attributes(AES-CBC:7) must be included. And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC3602 
  5.  IKE Interactions


  5.1.  Phase 1 Identifier


   For Phase 1 negotiations, IANA has assigned an Encryption Algorithm
   ID of 7 for AES-CBC.




Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)
draft-hoffman-ikev1-algorithms-02.txt
3.  New algorithm requirements


   The new requirements for IKEv1 are:


   o  TripleDES for encryption MUST be supported
   o  AES-128 in CBC mode [RFC3602] SHOULD be supported
   o  SHA-1 for hashing and HMAC functions MUST be supported
   o  Pre-shared secrets for authentication MUST be supported
   o  AES-128 in CBC mode for HMAC functions ([RFC3566] and [RFC3664])
      SHOULD be supported
   o  Diffie-Hellman MODP group 2 (discrete log 1024 bits) MUST be
      supported
   o  Diffie-Hellman MODP group 14 (discrete log 2048 bits) [RFC3526]
      SHOULD be supported
   o  RSA for authentication with signatures SHOULD be supported


   The other algorithms that were listed at MUST-level and SHOULD-level
   in RFC 2409 are now MAY-level.  This includes DES for encryption, MD5
   and Tiger for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1, Diffie-Hellman
   MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for authentication with
   signatures, and RSA for authentication with encryption.  DES for
   encryption, MD5 for hashing, Diffie-Hellman MODP group 1 are dropped
   to MAY due to cryptographic weakness.  Tiger for hashing,
   Diffie-Hellman MODP groups with elliptic curves, DSA for
   authentication with signatures, and RSA for authentication with
   encryption are dropped due to lack of any significant deployment and
   interoperability.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut