#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 # Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_I_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.seq,v 1.16.2.4 2005/11/28 11:34:16 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_I_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.seq,v 1.16.2.4 2005/11/28 11:34:16 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF1 = Link1; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_send_id' => 'on', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'both', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '60', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'ipsec_p_send_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p_send_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_p_select_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p_select_mode' => 'Tunnel', ); #====== set TN's cookie and nonce ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; my $nonce1 = '00000000000000000000000000000001'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'} = $nonce; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_r'} = $nonce1; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'} = 4096; vLogHTML("CKY-R: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("ISAKMP Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("IPsec Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("responder SPI : $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); my $PH2_EXPLT = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_p1_t1_lt'}; my $PKT_INTERVAL = 3; #====== start pre test sequence ====== #------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Echo Request message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; my $ret_echo = packetSendOnly($IF1, 'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); if($ret_echo == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my %ret0 = ikePh2PreSeqI($IF0,$cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig); if($ret0{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase start ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret1 = ikePh2Recv($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret0, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); my %ret2 = ikePh2Send2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret3 = ikePh2Recv3rd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); my $firstST = time(); if($ret3{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #-------------------------- # Save first spi and keys #-------------------------- my $spi_r_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'}; my $enc_key_i_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_i'}; my $hash_key_i_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_i'}; my $spi_i_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'}; my $enc_key_r_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_r'}; my $hash_key_r_keep = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_r'}; #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** 1st IPsec SA is esatblished ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- $cpp = "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Receive Encapsulated Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; my @ipsec_frame = ('echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); my %ret_echo = ipsecRecv($IF0, 3, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ipsec_frame,\%ikeConfig); if($ret_echo{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_recv_esp_tunnel_net2sgw1_net3sgw2'} = 'Received Encapsulated Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; my $send_frame = ('echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); my @recv_frame = ('echo_request_recv_esp_tunnel_net2sgw1_net3sgw2'); my $fromside = 'initiator'; #------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Echo Request message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------- my %ret_echo_retry = ipsecSendRecvSGW($fromside, $IF1, $IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, $send_frame, \@recv_frame, \%ikeConfig); if($ret_echo_retry{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } my $rcv_count = 1; #--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message recv $rcv_count ***
"); #--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- my $send_pkt_count; #----------------------- # Packet Description #----------------------- $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_esp_tunnel_net3sgw2_net2sgw1'} = 'Send Encapsulated Echo Request from HOST-2 to HOST-1 via SGW2(TN)', $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_recv_net4host2_net0host1'} = 'Receive Echo Request from HOST-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)', ## ## The following comment outed sequence may be required to keep inbound IPsec SA on NUT ## ##------------------------------------------------------------------- ## Send IPsec Echo Request using 1st IPsec SA from TN ##------------------------------------------------------------------- ##------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message send using 1st IPsec SA ***
"); ##------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #vClear($IF1); #vClear($IF0); #$cpp = "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; #my $send_frame = 'echo_request_send_esp_tunnel_net3sgw2_net2sgw1'; #my @recv_frame = ('echo_request_recv_net4host2_net0host1'); #my $fromside = 'responder'; #$elapsedTime = time() - $firstST; #vLogHTML("## 1st SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime ##
"); #$send_pkt_count ++; #%ret = ipsecSendRecvSGW($fromside, $IF0, $IF1, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, $send_frame, \@recv_frame,\%ikeConfig); #if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { # ikeReset(); # exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); #} ##----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message using 1st IPsec SA is accepted ***
"); ##----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Re-key testing phase start ***
"); #====================================================================== my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; #---------------------------- #make cpp for echo request #---------------------------- my $cpp = undef; $cpp = makeCppforIpsecRecv(\%ikeConfig,$cpp); $cpp .= "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; #------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Echo Request message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); my $ret_echo1_rekey = packetSendOnly($IF1, 'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); if($ret_echo1_rekey == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my $elapsedTime = undef; my %ret_wait_expire = (); while(1){ @ike = ('echo_request_recv_esp_tunnel_net2sgw1_net3sgw2'); $elapsedTime = time() - $firstST; vLogHTML("## 1st SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime ##
"); %ret_wait_expire = ikePh2Recv($IF0, $PKT_INTERVAL, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret0, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); my $recvFrameName = $ret_wait_expire{'recvFrame'}; vLogHTML("## Recv FrameName=$recvFrameName ##
") if $IKE::remote_debug; if($recvFrameName =~ /echo_request/){ $rcv_count++; #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message recv $rcv_count ***
"); #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- next; }elsif($recvFrameName =~ /isakmp_phase2_recv/){ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Re-Key 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- last; } if($elapsedTime >= $PH2_EXPLT) { $ret_wait_expire{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL; last; } #------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Echo Request message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; packetSendOnly($IF1, 'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); } if($ret_wait_expire{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #new SPI for responder $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'} = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'} + 1; #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Re-Key 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); @ike = (); $cpp = undef; my %ret_rekey2 = ikePh2Send2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret_rekey1, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Re-Key 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret_rekey3 = ikePh2Recv3rd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret_rekey2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); my $secondST = time(); my $elapsedTime2 = 0; if($ret_rekey3{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** 2nd IPsec SA is esatblished ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #------------------------------------------------------------------- #keep second key and spi #------------------------------------------------------------------- my $spi_r_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'}; my $enc_key_i_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_i'}; my $hash_key_i_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_i'}; my $spi_i_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'}; my $enc_key_r_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_r'}; my $hash_key_r_second = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_r'}; vLogHTML("## 1st IPsec parameters
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("## Initiator ##
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### SPI =$spi_r_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### encKey =$enc_key_i_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### hashKey=$hash_key_i_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("## Responder ##
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### SPI =$spi_i_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### encKey =$enc_key_r_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### hashKey=$hash_key_r_keep
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("## 2nd IPsec parameters
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("## Initiator ##
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### SPI =$spi_r_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### encKey =$enc_key_i_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### hashKey=$hash_key_i_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("## Responder ##
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### SPI =$spi_i_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### encKey =$enc_key_r_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("### hashKey=$hash_key_r_second
") if $IKE::remote_debug; $elapsedTime = time() - $firstST; if ($elapsedTime >= $PH2_EXPLT ){ #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Failed this test, because 1st IPsec SA is expired: $elapsedTime sec ***
"); #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- #send IPsec Echo Request using 1st IPsec SA from TN #------------------------------------------------------------------- # Use first key and spi #----------------------- # For decode #----------------------- $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_r'} = $spi_r_second; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_i'} = $enc_key_i_second; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_i'} = $hash_key_i_second; #------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Echo Request message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $cpp = "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; my $send_frame = ('echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); my @recv_frame = ('echo_request_recv_esp_tunnel_net2sgw1_net3sgw2'); my $fromside = 'initiator'; my %ret_echo_retry = ipsecSendRecvSGW($fromside, $IF1, $IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, $send_frame, \@recv_frame, \%ikeConfig); if($ret_echo_retry{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message recv using 2nd IPsec SA ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ #----------------------- # Use second key and spi #----------------------- # For encode #----------------------- $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'} = $spi_i_keep; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_r'} = $enc_key_r_keep; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_r'} = $hash_key_r_keep; #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message send using 1st IPsec SA ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); $cpp = "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; my $send_frame = 'echo_request_send_esp_tunnel_net3sgw2_net2sgw1'; my @recv_frame = ('echo_request_recv_net4host2_net0host1'); my $fromside = 'responder'; $send_pkt_count ++; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_seq_number_recv'} = $send_pkt_count; $elapsedTime = time() - $firstST; $elapsedTime2 = time() - $secondST; vLogHTML("## 1st SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime ##
"); vLogHTML("## 2nd SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime2 ##
"); %ret = ipsecSendRecvSGW($fromside, $IF0, $IF1, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, $send_frame, \@recv_frame,\%ikeConfig); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message using 1st IPsec SA is accepted ***
"); #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- $elapsedTime2 = time() - $secondST; if ($elapsedTime2 >= $PH2_EXPLT){ #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Failed this test, because 2nd IPsec SA is expired: $elapsedTime2 sec ***
"); #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- #send IPsec Echo Request using 2nd IPsec SA from TN #------------------------------------------------------------------- # Use second key and spi #----------------------- # For encode #----------------------- $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'} = $spi_i_second; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_enc_key_r'} = $enc_key_r_second; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_hash_key_r'} = $hash_key_r_second; #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message send using 2nd IPsec SA ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $cpp = "-DIPSEC_NEXT_HEADER=41 "; my $send_frame = 'echo_request_send_esp_tunnel_net3sgw2_net2sgw1'; my @recv_frame = ('echo_request_recv_net4host2_net0host1'); my $fromside = 'responder'; $send_pkt_count = undef; $elapsedTime = time() - $firstST; $elapsedTime2 = time() - $secondST; vLogHTML("## 1st SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime ##
"); vLogHTML("## 2nd SA elapsed time: $elapsedTime2 ##
"); %ret = ipsecSendRecvSGW($fromside, $IF0, $IF1, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, $send_frame, \@recv_frame,\%ikeConfig); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Encrypted Echo Request message using 1st IPsec SA is accepted ***
"); #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Using both old and new SA for incoming traffic is correct
"); #----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_I_RFC2408_5_3_2_2 - [Initiator Test] Using both old and new SA for incoming traffic =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_I_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points

      	   
    • A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA.
	   
      •

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Main  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA  
            30 sec          
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any            
          
         
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Main
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA 
            30 sec 
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address

  • Pre-Sequence

    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


 * PHASE I


Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.



           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; HASH_R


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Send the fourth message from TN
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function). 


   6. Send the sixth message from TN
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).



                        AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #     Initiator(NUT)   Direction      Responder(TN)      NOTE
(1)  HDR; SA; KE;      =>                        Begin ISAKMP-SA or
                                                 Proxy negotiation
     NONCE; IDii                                 and Key Exchange


(2)                    <=     HDR; SA; KE;
                              NONCE; IDir; AUTH
                                                 Initiator Identity
                                                 Verified by Responder
                                                 Key Generated
                                                 Basic SA agreed upon


(3)  HDR*; AUTH        =>
                                                 Responder Identity
                                                 Verified by Initiator
                                                 SA established


   1. Recieve the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).  There
      can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e.  no choices)
      in order for the aggressive exchange to work.  Keying material used
      to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
      used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
      also transmitted.  Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
      be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
      participation in the exchange.  Additionally, the initiator transmits
      identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads.  Keying material used to arrive at a common
      shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
      liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
      Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
      authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
      the exchange.  Additionally, the responder transmits identification
      information.  All of this information is transmitted under the
      protection of the agreed upon authentication function.  Local
      security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
      protection suite is accepted.  One possible action is the
      transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
      Exchange.


   3. Recieve the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
      agreed upon authentication function.  This information is transmitted
      under the protection of the common shared secret.  Local security
      policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
      One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
      of an Informational Exchange.



  The test sequence is following.


 * PHASE II


                      the first QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
     SA, Ni,IDci, IDcr; ========>


(2)                     <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, IDci, IDcr;


(3)  HDR*, HASH(3)      ========>


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send HASH(3).
      HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
      value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
      of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
      the responder's-- minus the payload header.


 * the first IPsec transmission


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  IP_HDR; ESP*; 
     ICMP(Echo request)  ========>
                Judgement #1


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), initiator(NUT) forward Echo request from HOST-1(TN) 
      to responder (TN) with IPsec SA.


In order to start the negotiation of the second Phase II(re-keing), 
TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2) every 3 seconds.


 * PHASE II  


                      the second QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1),  
     SA, Ni,IDci, IDcr; ========>


(2)                     <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, IDci, IDcr;


(3)  HDR*, HASH(3)      ========>


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send HASH(3).
      HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
      value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
      of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
      the responder's-- minus the payload header.


 * the second IPsec transmission


 #    Host(TN)            Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)            =======>   ICMP(Echo request)


(2)                                          ========>     IP_HDR; ESP*; ICMP(Echo requesst)
                                            Judgement #2


(3)                                          <========     IP_HDR; ESP*; ICMP(Echo requesst) <----This message is sent before the
												  1st SA expires.


(4)            <=======   ICMP(Echo request)
              Judgement #3


(5)                                          <========     IP_HDR; ESP*; ICMP(Echo requesst) <----This message is sent before the
                                                                                                  2nd SA expires.


(6)            <=======   ICMP(Echo request)
              Judgement #4


   1. Send the 1st message from NUT
      HOST-1(TN) send Echo request to HOST-2(TN)


   2. Receive the 1st message from NUT
      Initiator(NUT) encapuslate it using IPsec SA that established by 2nd QUICK MODE  
      and forward it to Responder(TN).


   3. Send the 1st message from TN
      Responder(TN) send ecapuslated Echo request from HOST-2(TN) 
      to initiator(NUT) using IPsec SA that established by 1st QUICK MODE.    


   4. Receive the 2nd message from NUT
      Initiator(NUT) decapsulate it using IPsec SA that established by 1st QUICK MODE  
      and forward Echo request from HOST-2(TN) to HOST-1(TN). 


   5. Send the 3rd message from TN
      Responder(TN) send ecapuslated Echo request from HOST-2(TN) 
      to initiator(NUT) using IPsec SA that established by 2nd QUICK MODE.  


   6. Receive the 4th message from NUT
      Initiator(NUT) decapsulate it using IPsec SA that established by 2nd QUICK MODE  
      and forward Echo request from HOST-2(TN) to HOST-1(TN).
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly. In Phase II , the first and the second IPsec SA must be established correctly. 1st IPsec trasmission is sent correctly. And the following condition must be satisfied. 1) The 1st message must be accepted. 2) And 2nd message is fowarded using 2nd IPsec SA. 3) The 3rd message using the 1st IPsec SA must be accepted. 4) And 4th message is fowarded 5) The 5th message using the 2nd IPsec SA must be accepted. 6) And 6th message is fowarded And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2408
  4.3 Security Association Modification


   Security Association modification within ISAKMP is accomplished by
   creating a new SA and initiating communications using that new SA.
   Deletion of the old SA can be done anytime after the new SA is
   established.  Deletion of the old SA is dependent on local security
   policy.  Modification of SAs by using a "Create New SA followed by
   Delete Old SA" method is done to avoid potential vulnerabilities in
   synchronizing modification of existing SA attributes.  The procedure
   for creating new SAs is outlined in section 4.2.  The procedure for
   deleting SAs is outlined in section 5.15.


   Modification of an ISAKMP SA (phase 1 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of an ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship
   between the two SAs and the initiator and responder cookie pairs
   SHOULD be different, as outlined in section 2.5.3.


   Modification of a Protocol SA (phase 2 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of a Protocol SA. The creation of a new SA is
   protected by the existing ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship between
   the two Protocol SAs.  A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
   the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
   support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
   traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA. As
   stated previously in this section, deletion of an old SA is then
   dependent on local security policy.


   (omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut