SG_R_RFC2408_5_11_2_1_HASH - [Responder Test] Check the Hash to confirm it is supported
SGW
SG_R_RFC2408_5_11_2_1_HASH.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_11_2_1_HASH.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
|
|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
|
Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
|
|
ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
|
Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
Determine if the Hash is supported. If the Hash determination
fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are
taken:
(a) The event, INVALID HASH INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION message type MAY be
sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by
a system security policy.
| Machine | Src | Dest | Phase I | Phase II | ||||||||||||||
| Ex mode | Key Value | Enc Alg | Hash Alg | Auth Method | DH Group | PH1 Lt | IDx | Proto ID | Trans ID | Mode | Auth Alg | PH2 Lt | IDci | IDcr | Upper | |||
| SGW-1 | SGW-1 addr | SGW-2 addr | Main | IKE-TEST | 3DES | SHA | pre-shared key | 2 | 8 Hour | SGW-1 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-v addr | Net-z addr | any |
| SGW-2 | SGW-2 addr | SGW-1 addr | Main | IKE-TEST | 3DES | SHA | pre-shared key | 2 | 8 Hour | SGW-2 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-v addr | Net-z addr | any |
This test check is following.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========> <----Hash Data field : not include this field (invalid)
(6-A) X <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R <-----Must not transmit or (6-B) <======== HDR*; HASH(1); N/D (HDR; N/D) Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT In the sixth message (6-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
The first to the fourth message must be exchanged correctly.
The fifth message must not be accepted. And the sixth message(6-A) must not be returned
(* or INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION message(6-B) is returned).
*option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408 5.11 Hash Payload Processing
(omit)
When a Hash payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine if the Hash is supported. If the Hash determination fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID HASH INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload containing the INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a system security policy.
2. Perform the Hash function as outlined in the DOI and/or Key Exchange protocol documents. If the Hash function fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID HASH VALUE, MAY be logged in the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload containing the AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a system security policy.
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