#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 # Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_RFC2409_5_5_5.seq,v 1.34.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:09 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_R_RFC2409_5_5_5.seq,v 1.34.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:09 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; my $IF1 = Link1; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'both', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', 'ipsec_p_send_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p_send_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_p_select_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p_select_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p_select_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p_select_lt_unit' => 'hour', 'ipsec_send_id' => 'on', ); #====== set TN's cookie ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'} = $nonce; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_i'} = '00000000000000000000000000000001'; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'} = '0x00001000'; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_message_id'} = '0000ffff'; vLogHTML("CKY-I: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("Ni-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set other date about this test ======== #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); my %ret0 = ikePh2PreSeqR($IF0,$cpp,\@ike, \%ikeConfig); my %phase1_keep = %ret0; #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase start ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $cpp = "-DINVALID_PHASE2_SEND_1ST_ID "; my %ret1 = ikePh2Send1st($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret0, \%ikeConfig); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } if($IKE::NOTIFY_CHECK eq undef){ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 2nd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(1) + shiftFlag(2) + shiftFlag(3) + shiftFlag(8) + shiftFlag(10); #ALL my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret = ikePh2Recv2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::PASS) { vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("NG:Phase-2 2nd message is returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); }else{ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("OK:Phase-2 2nd message is not returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); } }else{ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 Notify recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'INVALID-ID-INFORMATION'}); my $encryptiontype= '1'; my %ret2 = ikeRecvNotify($IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, \@ike, \%phase1_keep, \%ikeConfig,\@notifyMessageID,$encryptiontype); if($ret2{'status'} >= 2) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Invalid Identification Payload is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_R_RFC2409_5_5_5 - [Responder Test] Invalid Identification Payload =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_R_RFC2409_5_5_5.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2409_5_5_5.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points

      • 	   
    • If the client identities are not acceptable to the Quick
Mode responder (due to policy or other reasons), a Notify payload
with Notify Message Type INVALID-ID-INFORMATION (18) SHOULD be sent.
       
      •

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Identification Payload Format(IDci,In Phase II)
      • 
           Identification Type field : 6(ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET)
      
           Protocol ID field : 0(any)
      
           Port field : 0(any)
      
           (NUT:SGW-1)Identification Data field : 3ffe:501:ffff:104::,ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff::
      
           (TN:SGW-2)Identification Data field : ::(invalid value)
      
       
    • Identification Payload Format(IDcr,In Phase II)
      • 
           Identification Type field : 6(ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET)
      
           Protocol ID field : 0(any)
      
           Port field : 0(any)
      
           Identification Data field : 3ffe:501:ffff:100::,ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff::
      
       
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Main  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour            
            Net-v addr          
            Net-z addr   
            any            
          
         
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Main
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour          
            ::          
            Net-z addr   
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


 * PHASE I


Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.



           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; HASH_R


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Send the fifth message from TN
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function). 


   6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).



                        AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #     Initiator(TN)   Direction      Responder(NUT)      NOTE
(1)  HDR; SA; KE;      =>                        Begin ISAKMP-SA or
                                                 Proxy negotiation
     NONCE; IDii                                 and Key Exchange


(2)                    <=     HDR; SA; KE;
                              NONCE; IDir; AUTH
                                                 Initiator Identity
                                                 Verified by Responder
                                                 Key Generated
                                                 Basic SA agreed upon


(3)  HDR*; AUTH        =>
                                                 Responder Identity
                                                 Verified by Initiator
                                                 SA established


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).  There
      can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e.  no choices)
      in order for the aggressive exchange to work.  Keying material used
      to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
      used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
      also transmitted.  Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
      be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
      participation in the exchange.  Additionally, the initiator transmits
      identification information.


   2. Recieve the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads.  Keying material used to arrive at a common
      shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
      liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
      Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
      authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
      the exchange.  Additionally, the responder transmits identification
      information.  All of this information is transmitted under the
      protection of the agreed upon authentication function.  Local
      security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
      protection suite is accepted.  One possible action is the
      transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
      Exchange.


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
      agreed upon authentication function.  This information is transmitted
      under the protection of the common shared secret.  Local security
      policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
      One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
      of an Informational Exchange.



  The test sequence is following.


 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
     SA, Ni,IDci, IDcr; ========>                            <-----ID data field : ::(invalid)


(2-A)                 X <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, <-----Must not transmit
                                                IDci, IDcr;
                                            or
(2-B)                   <========     HDR*, HASH(1), N/D
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly. In Phase II , the first message is not accepted. The second message(2-A) must not be returned (* or INVALID-ID-INFORMATION message(2-B) is returned). *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2409
  5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode


  (omit)


   The identities of the SAs negotiated in Quick Mode are implicitly
   assumed to be the IP addresses of the ISAKMP peers, without any
   implied constraints on the protocol or port numbers allowed, unless
   client identifiers are specified in Quick Mode.  If ISAKMP is acting
   as a client negotiator on behalf of another party, the identities of
   the parties MUST be passed as IDci and then IDcr.  Local policy will
   dictate whether the proposals are acceptable for the identities
   specified.  If the client identities are not acceptable to the Quick
   Mode responder (due to policy or other reasons), a Notify payload
   with Notify Message Type INVALID-ID-INFORMATION (18) SHOULD be sent.


  (omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut