#!/usr/bin/perl
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# $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.seq,v 1.29.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:10 ozoe Exp $
# $Id: SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.seq,v 1.29.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:10 ozoe Exp $
#
######################################################################
BEGIN {
}

use V6evalTool;
use IKE;
use IKE_check;

my $IF0 = Link0;
my $IF1 = Link1;

#====== get sequence arguments ======
foreach (@ARGV) {
       /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; };
       /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; };
       /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; };
       /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; };
       ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'");
}

#====== check NUT type ======
ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT);


#====== Test Configuration ======
%ikeConfig = (
	'app_type'              => 'ICMP',
	'isakmp_src'            => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}",
	'isakmp_dst'            => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}",
	'isakmp_dport'          => '500',
	'isakmp_ex_mode'        => 'main',
	'isakmp_doi'            => 'ipsec_doi',
	'isakmp_situation'      => 'identity_only',
	'isakmp_key_id'         => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}",
	'isakmp_key_value'      => 'IKE-TEST',
	'isakmp_enc_alg'        => '3des',
	'isakmp_hash_alg'       => 'sha1',
	'isakmp_auth_method'    => 'pre_shared_key',
	'isakmp_dh_group'       => '2',
	'isakmp_lt'             => '28800',
	'isakmp_lt_unit'        => 'seconds',
	'isakmp_src_id_type'    => 'address',
	'isakmp_src_id'         => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}",
	'isakmp_dst_id_type'    => 'address',
	'isakmp_dst_id'         => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}",
	'isakmp_num_pro'        => '1',
	'isakmp_num_trans'      => '1',
	'ipsec_id_type'         => 'address',
	'ipsec_dst'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_src'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_dst_id'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_src_id'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_tdst'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_tsrc'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_end_dst'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_end_src'		=> "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}",
	'ipsec_send_id' 	=> 'on',
	'ipsec_supper'          => 'any',
	'ipsec_dupper'          => 'any',
	'ipsec_direction'       => 'in',
	'ipsec_pfs_group'       => 'on',
	'ipsec_dh_group'        => '2',
	'ipsec_p_num'           => '1',
	'ipsec_p1_proto'        => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP',
	'ipsec_p1_t_num'        => '1',
	'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg'   => 'ESP_3DES',
	'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd'  => 'HMAC_SHA',
	'ipsec_p1_t1_mode'      => 'Tunnel',
	'ipsec_p1_t1_lt'        => '8',
	'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit'   => 'hour',
	'ipsec_p_send_proto'    => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP',
	'ipsec_p_send_trans'    => '1',
	'ipsec_p_select_alg'    => 'ESP_3DES',
	'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA',
	'ipsec_p_select_mode'   => 'Tunnel',
	'ipsec_p_select_lt'        => '8',
	'ipsec_p_select_lt_unit'   => 'hour',
);

#====== set TN's cookie ========
my $cookie      = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time());
$cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16);
my $nonce       = '00000000000000000000000000000000';
$ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'}   = $cookie;
$ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'}    = $nonce;
$ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_i'}     = '00000000000000000000000000000001';
$ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'}    	= '0x00001000';
$ikeConfig{'ipsec_message_id'}	= '0000ffff';

vLogHTML("<B>CKY-I: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'}</B><BR>") if $IKE::remote_debug;
vLogHTML("<B>Ni-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'}</B><BR>") if $IKE::remote_debug;
vLogHTML("<B>pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}</B><BR>") if $IKE::remote_debug;

#====== set other date about this test ========

#====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #======
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Target IKE initialization phase ***</FONT><BR>");
ikeInit(%ikeConfig);

#====== set Address of NUT ======
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Target initialization phase ***</FONT><BR>");
vCapture($IF0);
vCapture($IF1);
ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug);

#====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #======
my $cpp = undef;
my @ike = ();

my %ret1 = ikePh2PreSeqR($IF0,$cpp,\@ike, \%ikeConfig);

#======================================================================
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Target testing phase start ***<FONT><BR>");
#======================================================================
#-------------------------------------------------------------------
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Phase-2 1st message send ***<FONT><BR>");
#-------------------------------------------------------------------
vClear($IF0);
vClear($IF1);

my %ret2 = ikePh2Send1st($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig);
if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) {
        ikeReset();
        exit($V6evalTool::exitFail);
}

#-------------------------------------------------------------------
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Phase-2 2nd message recv ***<FONT><BR>");
#-------------------------------------------------------------------
my @CHECK_FLAG = undef;
$CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; #none
my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; 

my %ret3 = ikePh2Recv2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG);


#does KEpayload exists
my $base = 'Frame_Ether.Packet_IPv6.Upp_UDP.Udp_ISAKMP';
my $plunderplainKey = $base . '.ISAKMP_Encryption.Decrypted.PlainText';

my $plunderplain = $ret3{$plunderplainKey};
print("plunderplain=$plunderplain\n");

if($plunderplain =~ /Pld_ISAKMP_KE/){
    if($IKE::payload_check_debug > 0){
	vLogHTML('<FONT COLOR="#0000FF">');
	vLogHTML("**OK KE Payload exists<BR>");
	vLogHTML('</FONT>');
    }
}else{
    vLogHTML('<FONT COLOR="#FF0000">');
    vLogHTML("**NG KE Payload does not exists<BR>");
    vLogHTML('</FONT>');
    $ret{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL;
}

#####################
# DH Group check
######################
my $atttype = 3;
my $attvalue = $ikeConfig{'ipsec_dh_group'};
my $attret = &IKE_check::SpecificAttributeCheckFromSeq(\%ret3,$atttype,$attvalue,1);

if($attret < 0){
    $ret{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL
}
if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) {
	ikeReset();
	exit($V6evalTool::exitFail);
}


#-------------------------------------------------------------------
vLogHTML("<FONT COLOR=#006666>enable PFS with DH2 is correct</FONT><BR>");
#-------------------------------------------------------------------
#======================================================================
vLogHTML("<FONT SIZE=3>*** Target test finish ***<FONT><BR>");
#======================================================================
vStop($IF0);
vStop($IF1);

ikeReset();
ikeExitPass();
#NOTREACHED


######################################################################
__END__

=head1 NAME

  SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2 - [Responder Test]enable PFS with DH2

=head1 TARGET

  SGW

=head1 SYNOPSIS

=begin html
<PRE>
  <A HREF="./SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.seq">SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.seq</A> [-tooloption ...] -pkt <A HREF="./SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.def">SG_R_RFC2409_6_2_2.def</A> -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also <A HREF="../ike_common.def">ike_common.def</A> and <A HREF="../ike_ipsec.def">ike_ipsec.def</A> and <A HREF="../ike_addr.def">ike_addr.def</A> and <A HREF="../ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def">ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def</A> and <A HREF="../ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def">ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def</A>
</PRE>

=end html

=head1 INITIALIZATION

=begin html
  <ul>
     <li><STRONG>Network Topology</STRONG></li> 
  <PRE>
                                 HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)
  <BR>
  </PRE>
  
    <p></p>
    <li><STRONG>Verification Points</STRONG></li><p>
	   <ul><PRE>
        <li>DH Group</li>
        <b>IKE implementations SHOULD support a MODP group with the 
        following   prime and generator. This group is assigned id 2 
        (two).</b>
        <li>PFS</li>
        <b>For PFS to exist the key used to protect transmission of data MUST
        NOT be used to derive any additional keys,
        and if the key used to protect transmission of data was derived 
        from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT be used to
        derive any more keys.</b>
        <li>KE payload</li>
        <b>An optional Key Exchange payload can be exchanged to allow for 
        an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and exponentiation per 
        Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload with Quick Mode is 
        optional it MUST be supported.</b>
       </PRE></ul>
    </li>
    <p></p>
    <LI><STRONG>Configuration</STRONG></LI><p>
    <ul> 
	<PRE>
       <li>Initiator and Responder IKE parameter</li>
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          <TABLE border=1>
          <TBODY>
          <TR>
            <TD rowspan="2"><STRONG>Machine</STRONG></TD>              
            <TD rowspan="2"><STRONG>Src</STRONG></TD>              
            <TD rowspan="2"><STRONG>Dest</STRONG></TD>              
            <TD colspan="8"><STRONG>Phase I</STRONG></TD>             
            <TD colspan="9"><STRONG>Phase II</STRONG></TD>
          </TR>             
          <TR>             
            <TD><STRONG>Ex mode</STRONG></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Key Value</STRONG></TD> 
            <TD><STRONG>Enc Alg</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Hash Alg</STRONG></TD>           
            <TD><STRONG>Auth Method</STRONG></TD>           
            <TD><STRONG>DH Group</STRONG></TD>           
            <TD><STRONG>PH1 Lt</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>IDx</STRONG></p></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Proto ID</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Trans ID</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Mode</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Auth Alg</strong></TD>
            <TD bgcolor="#C0C0C0"><STRONG>DH Group</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>PH2 Lt</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>IDci</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>IDcr</strong></TD>
            <TD><STRONG>Upper</strong></TD>
          </TR>
          <TR>
            <TD>SGW-1</TD>           
            <TD>SGW-1 addr</TD>           
            <TD>SGW-2 addr</TD>           
            <TD>Main </TD> 
            <TD>IKE-TEST</TD>                               
            <TD>3DES</TD>           
            <TD>SHA</TD>           
            <TD>pre-shared key</TD>           
            <TD>2</TD>           
            <TD>8 Hour </TD>           
            <TD>SGW-1 addr</TD>              
            <TD>PROTO_IPSEC_ESP</TD>   
            <TD>ESP_3DES</TD>             
            <TD>Tunnel</TD>           
            <TD>HMAC-SHA</TD> 
            <TD>2</TD>  
            <TD>8 Hour </TD>          
            <TD>Net-v addr</TD>          
            <TD>Net-z addr</TD>   
            <TD>any </TD>           
          </tr>   
          <tr>   
            <TD>SGW-2</TD>
            <TD>SGW-2 addr</TD>
            <TD>SGW-1 addr</TD>
            <TD>Main</TD>
            <TD>IKE-TEST</TD>      
            <TD>3DES</TD>
            <TD>SHA</TD>
            <TD>pre-shared key</TD>           
            <TD>2</TD>           
            <TD>8 Hour</TD>
            <TD>SGW-2 addr</TD>    
            <TD>PROTO_IPSEC_ESP</TD>
            <TD>ESP_3DES</TD>     
            <TD>Tunnel</TD>
            <TD>HMAC-SHA</TD>
            <TD>2</TD>  
            <TD>8 Hour</TD> 
            <TD>Net-v addr</TD>          
            <TD>Net-z addr</TD>   
            <TD>any</TD>
          </tr>
          </TBODY>
        </TABLE>
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address
	</PRE>
   </UL>
   </UL>

=end html

=head1 TEST PROCEDURE

=begin html
<PRE>
  This test check is following.
<BR>
 * PHASE I
<BR>
Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.
<BR><BR>
           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
<BR>
 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>
<BR>
(2)                     <========       HDR; SA
<BR>
(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>
<BR>
(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE
<BR>
(5)  HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
<BR>
(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
<BR>
   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
<BR>
   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
<BR>
   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
<BR>
   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
<BR>
   5. Send the fifth message from TN
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function). 
<BR>
   6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).
<BR><BR>
                        AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
<BR>
 #     Initiator(TN)   Direction      Responder(NUT)      NOTE
(1)  HDR; SA; KE;      =>                        Begin ISAKMP-SA or
                                                 Proxy negotiation
     NONCE; IDii                                 and Key Exchange
<BR>
(2)                    <=     HDR; SA; KE;
                              NONCE; IDir; AUTH
                                                 Initiator Identity
                                                 Verified by Responder
                                                 Key Generated
                                                 Basic SA agreed upon
<BR>
(3)  HDR*; AUTH        =>
                                                 Responder Identity
                                                 Verified by Initiator
                                                 SA established
<BR>
   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).  There
      can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e.  no choices)
      in order for the aggressive exchange to work.  Keying material used
      to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
      used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
      also transmitted.  Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
      be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
      participation in the exchange.  Additionally, the initiator transmits
      identification information.
<BR>
   2. Recieve the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads.  Keying material used to arrive at a common
      shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
      liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
      Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
      authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
      the exchange.  Additionally, the responder transmits identification
      information.  All of this information is transmitted under the
      protection of the agreed upon authentication function.  Local
      security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
      protection suite is accepted.  One possible action is the
      transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
      Exchange.
<BR>
   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
      agreed upon authentication function.  This information is transmitted
      under the protection of the common shared secret.  Local security
      policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
      One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
      of an Informational Exchange.
<BR><BR>
  The test sequence is following.
<BR>
 * PHASE II
<BR>
                      QUICK MODE
<BR>
 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), SA, 
     Ni, KE ,IDci, IDcr;========> 
<BR>
(2)                     <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, KE, IDci, IDcr;
                Judgement (Check *1)
<BR>
   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness. KE is keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 
<BR>
   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.KE is keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret. IDci and IDcr is
      identification information. 
</PRE>

=end html

=head1 JUDGEMENT

        In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly.
        In Phase II ,  the first message must be accepted.  
        And the second message which has KE payload and DH2 as SA attribute
        must be received.
        And must conform to above Configuration.

=head1 TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

=head1 REFERENCE

=begin html
<PRE>
  RFC2409 
  3.3 Perfect Forward Secrecy
<BR>
   When used in the memo Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) refers to the
   notion that compromise of a single key will permit access to only
   data protected by a single key.<b> For PFS to exist the key used to
   protect transmission of data MUST NOT be used to derive any
   additional keys, and if the key used to protect transmission of data
   was derived from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT
   be used to derive any more keys.</b>
<BR>
   Perfect Forward Secrecy for both keys and identities is provided in
   this protocol. (Sections 5.5 and 8).
<BR>
  (omit)
<BR>
  5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
<BR>
  (omit)
<BR>
   Quick Mode is essentially a SA negotiation and an exchange of nonces
   that provides replay protection. The nonces are used to generate
   fresh key material and prevent replay attacks from generating bogus
   security associations.  <b>An optional Key Exchange payload can be
   exchanged to allow for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and
   exponentiation per Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload
   with Quick Mode is optional it MUST be supported.</b>
<BR>
  (omit)
<BR>
  6.2 Second Oakley Group
<BR>
   <b>IKE implementations SHOULD support a MODP group with the following
   prime and generator. This group is assigned id 2 (two).</b>
<BR>
   The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
   Its hexadecimal value is
<BR>
         FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
         29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
         EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
         E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
         EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
         FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
<BR>
   The generator is 2 (decimal)
</PRE>

=end html

=head1 SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

=begin html
<PRE>
  <A HREF="./IKE.html">IKE.html</A> IKE Test Common Utility
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