I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2 - [Initiator Test] Invalid Identification Payload receive
End-Node
I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:initiator
XXXX: EUI64 address
During Phase I negotiations, the ID port and protocol fields MUST be
set to zero or to UDP port 500. If an implementation receives any
other values, this MUST be treated as an error and the security
association setup MUST be aborted.
| Machine | Src | Dest | Phase I | Phase II | ||||||||||||
| Ex mode | Key Value | Enc Alg | Hash Alg | Auth Method | DH Group | PH1 Lt | IDx | Proto ID | Trans ID | Mode | Auth Alg | PH2 Lt | Upper | |||
| NUT | NUT addr | HOST-2 addr | Aggressive | IKE-TEST | 3DES | SHA | pre-shared key | 2 | 8 Hour | NUT addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Transport | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | any |
| HOST-2 | HOST-2 addr | NUT addr | Aggressive | IKE-TEST | 3DES | SHA | pre-shared key | 2 | 8 Hour | HOST-2 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Transport | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | any |
In order to start the negotiation of IKE, NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) (1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <----ID protocol/port : TCP/300(invalid value)
(3) HDR[*]; HASH_I ========> X <-----Must not transmit Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator transmits identification information.
2. Send the second message from TN In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder transmits identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
3. Receive the third message from NUT In the third (3) message, the initiator send the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
The second message must not be accepted. And the third message(3) must not be returned.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2407 4.6.2 Identification Payload Content
The Identification Payload is used to identify the initiator of the Security Association. The identity of the initiator SHOULD be used by the responder to determine the correct host system security policy requirement for the association. For example, a host might choose to require authentication and integrity without confidentiality (AH) from a certain set of IP addresses and full authentication with confidentiality (ESP) from another range of IP addresses. The Identification Payload provides information that can be used by the responder to make this decision.
During Phase I negotiations, the ID port and protocol fields MUST be set to zero or to UDP port 500. If an implementation receives any other values, this MUST be treated as an error and the security association setup MUST be aborted. This event SHOULD be auditable.
The following diagram illustrates the content of the Identification Payload.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! Next Payload ! RESERVED ! Payload Length ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! ID Type ! Protocol ID ! Port ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ~ Identification Data ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(omit)
RFC2408 5.8 Identification Payload Processing
(omit)
When an Identification payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine if the Identification Type is supported. This may be based on the DOI and Situation. If the Identification determination fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID ID INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload containing the INVALID-ID-INFORMATION message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a system security policy.
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