#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/ENODE/I_A_RFC2409_5_6.seq,v 1.15.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:41 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: I_A_RFC2409_5_6.seq,v 1.15.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:41 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(host, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'rsasig', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_certificate_type' => 'x509', 'isakmp_certificate_file' => 'NUTcert.pem', 'isakmp_privkey_file' => 'NUTprivkey.pem', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'asn1dn', # 'isakmp_src_id' => "root\@nut.com", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'asn1dn', # 'isakmp_dst_id' => "root\@tn.com", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'anonymous', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Transport', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie and nonce ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'} = $nonce; vLogHTML("CKY-R: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); ikeSetAddr($IF0); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); vClear($IF0); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my $ret3 = ikeSend2TN($IF0, 5, 0, 2, 1, \%ikeConfig); if($ret3 == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(1) + #SA shiftFlag(2) + #P shiftFlag(3) + #T shiftFlag(4) + #KE shiftFlag(5) + #ID shiftFlag(11); #Nonce my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'SAAttributeCheck'} + $IKE_check::optionHash{'phase1OrderCheck'} + $IKE_check::optionHash{'SAAttributeMultiCheck'} + $IKE_check::optionHash{'Phase1HashCheck'}; my %ret = ikePh1Recv_agg('Link0', 10, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } @ike=(); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); $cpp = "-DPHASE1_SEND_2nd_DSIG"; my %ret2 = ikePh1Send2nd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } @ike=(); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(6) + shiftFlag(9); #CERT, SIG payload #$OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'Phase1SigCheck'} + # $IKE_check::optionHash{'Phase1CertCheck'}; $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'Phase1SigCheck'}; my %ret3 = ikePh1Recv3rd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret3{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; #none $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret = ikePh2Recv($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret3, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Implementation of Aggressive Mode with RSA signatures check is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME I_A_RFC2409_5_6 - [Initiator Test] Implementation of Aggressive Mode with RSA signatures check =head1 TARGET End-Node =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  I_A_RFC2409_5_6.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_A_RFC2409_5_6.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •         HOST-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                        
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:initiator
  
    
  XXXX: EUI64 address

  • Verification Points
      
       
    • Implementation of Aggressive Mode with RSA signatures check.
      •

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder generate the public key and the secret key
      • 
       
    • Initiator and Responder exchange the certificate of each other.
      • 
       
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
                                           
            3DES           
            SHA           
            RSA signatures           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Transport            
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            any            
          
         
          
         
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Aggressive
                  
            3DES
            SHA
            RSA signatures           
            2           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
  • Pre-Sequence
    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


 * PHASE I


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
                Judgement (Check *1)


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, SIG_R


(3)  HDR[*]; SIG_I         ========>
                Judgement (Check *2)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the signed data, SIG_I is 
      the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_I.


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the signed data, SIG_I 
      is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_I.


 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
           SA, Ni       ========>
                Judgement (Check *3)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In Phase I, the first to the third message must be exchanged correctly. Check *1 Security Association, Key Exchange, Nonce, Identification Payload Format must be base on description of RFC. Check *2 Signature Payload Format must be base on description of RFC. In Phase II, the first message must be received. Check *3 NUT must start Phase II negotiation. And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2409 
  4. Introduction


   (omit)


     IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:


      - DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check
      (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in
      Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.


      - MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].


      - Authentication via pre-shared keys.


      - MODP over default group number one (see below).


   In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption;
   Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA]
   signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and
   MODP group number 2.  IKE implementations MAY support any additional
   encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and
   EC2N groups.


   (omit)


  5. Exchanges


   There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key
   exchange: Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated
   keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode
   MUST be implemented; Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In
   addition, Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate
   fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In
   addition, New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to
   define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations
   MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.


   (omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut