#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/ENODE/I_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.seq,v 1.42.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:42 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: I_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.seq,v 1.42.2.2 2005/11/22 10:05:42 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(host, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Transport', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie and nonce ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'} = $nonce; vLogHTML("CKY-R: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); ikeSetAddr($IF0); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); vClear($IF0); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my $ret3 = ikeSend2TN($IF0, 5, 0, 2, 1, \%ikeConfig); if($ret3 == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret = ikePh1Recv('Link0', 10, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); %ret2 = ikePh1Send2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret = ikePh1Recv3rd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @ike = (); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 4th message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); %ret2 = ikePh1Send4th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 5th message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret = ikePh1Recv5th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike,\%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 6th message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); $cpp = ' -DINVALID_PHASE1_SEND_6th_ID_NOT_SEND '; %ret2 = ikePh1Send6th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } if($IKE::NOTIFY_CHECK eq undef){ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; #none $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret = ikePh2Recv($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::PASS) { vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("NG:Phase-2 1st message is returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); }else{ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("OK:Phase-2 1st message is not returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); } }else { #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 Notify recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'INVALID-ID-INFORMATION'}); my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'ALL'}); my $encryptiontype= '1'; $cpp=$ikeConfig{'cpp_phase1_recv_5th'} . ' ' . $ikeConfig{'cpp_phase1_recv_1st'}; %pktdesc = ( %pktdesc, 'isakmp_phase1_recv' => 'Recv 1st message from HOST1(NUT)', 'isakmp_phase1_recv_5th' => 'Recv 5th message from HOST1(NUT)', ); @ike = ( @ike, 'isakmp_phase1_recv', 'isakmp_phase1_recv_5th', ); %ret = ikeRecvNotify($IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@notifyMessageID,$encryptiontype); if($ret{'status'} >= 2) { ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Not include Identification Payload is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); ikeRemoteAsyncWait(); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME I_RFC2407_4_2_1_2 - [Initiator Test] Not include Identification Payload =head1 TARGET End-Node =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  I_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •         HOST-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                        
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:initiator
  
    
  XXXX: EUI64 address

  • Verification Points
         All IPSEC DOI implementations MUST support SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY by 
     including an Identification Payload in at least one of the Phase I Oakley
     exchanges and MUST abort any association setup that does not include 
     an Identification Payload.

  • Configuration

             
    • Responder(TN) does not send ID payload by the the sixth message.

      • 
       
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Main  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Transport            
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            any            
          
         
          
         
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Main
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

  • Pre-Sequence

    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)      Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii;  
         HASH_I         ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; HASH_R      <----not include ID payload(invalid)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Send the fourth message from TN
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).
      In this test, TN does not send identification information(ID payload).


   6. Send the sixth message from TN
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).  


 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
           SA, Ni       ========>                           <----must not start Phase II
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The first to the fifth message must be exchanged correctly. The sixth message must not be accepted. And Phase II must not start (Not establish ISAKMP SA, Not start negotiation of Phase II). =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2407
  4.2.1 SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY


   The SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY type specifies that the security association
   will be identified by source identity information present in an
   associated Identification Payload.  See Section 4.6.2 for a complete
   description of the various Identification types.  All IPSEC DOI
   implementations MUST support SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY by including an
   Identification Payload in at least one of the Phase I Oakley
   exchanges ([IKE], Section 5) and MUST abort any association setup
   that does not include an Identification Payload.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut