I_RFC2408_5_11_2_2 - [Initiator Test] HASH Payload Format check(Phase II)
End-Node
I_RFC2408_5_11_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC2408_5_11_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:initiator
XXXX: EUI64 address
Verification Points
HASH Payload Format
Next Payload field
Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
RESERVED Fields
All RESERVED fields in the ISAKMP protocol MUST be set to zero (0).
Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.
Payload Length field
Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length field.
Hash Data field
Data that results from applying the hash routine to the ISAKMP
message and/or state.
( HASH(3) = prf(SKEYID_a, 0 | M-ID | Ni_b | Nr_b) )
Configuration
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
Upper |
| NUT |
NUT addr |
HOST-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
NUT addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
| HOST-2 |
HOST-2 addr |
NUT addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
HOST-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*NUT addr = NUT address
*HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
Pre-Sequence
In order to start the negotiation of IKE,
NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
* PHASE I
Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Receive the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Send the fourth message from TN
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Send the sixth message from TN
In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) NOTE
(1) HDR; SA; KE; => Begin ISAKMP-SA or
Proxy negotiation
NONCE; IDii and Key Exchange
(2) <= HDR; SA; KE;
NONCE; IDir; AUTH
Initiator Identity
Verified by Responder
Key Generated
Basic SA agreed upon
(3) HDR*; AUTH =>
Responder Identity
Verified by Initiator
SA established
1. Recieve the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). There
can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e. no choices)
in order for the aggressive exchange to work. Keying material used
to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
also transmitted. Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
participation in the exchange. Additionally, the initiator transmits
identification information.
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common
shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
the exchange. Additionally, the responder transmits identification
information. All of this information is transmitted under the
protection of the agreed upon authentication function. Local
security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
protection suite is accepted. One possible action is the
transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
Exchange.
3. Recieve the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
agreed upon authentication function. This information is transmitted
under the protection of the common shared secret. Local security
policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
of an Informational Exchange.
The test sequence is following.
* PHASE II
QUICK MODE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni ========>
(2) <======== HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr
(3) HDR*, HASH(3) ========>
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness.
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
complete message. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness.
3. Receive the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator send HASH(3).
HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
the responder's-- minus the payload header.
In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly.
In Phase II , the first and the second message must be exchange correctly.
The third message's HASH Payload Format must be base on description
of RFC(see above Verification Points).
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing
When creating any of the ISAKMP Payloads described in sections 3.4
through 3.15 a Generic Payload Header is placed at the beginning of
these payloads. When creating the Generic Payload Header, the
transmitting entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
These values are described in section 3.1.
2. Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.
3. Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
field.
4. Construct the payloads as defined in the remainder of this
section.
(omit)
5.11 Hash Payload Processing
When creating a Hash Payload, the transmitting entity (initiator or
responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine the Hash function to be used as defined by the SA
negotiation.
2. Determine the usage of the Hash Data field as defined by the DOI.
3. Construct a Hash payload.
4. Transmit the message to the receiving entity as described in
section 5.1.
(omit)
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