I_RFC2409_4_5 - [Initiator Test] ISAKMP Header Format check(Phase II)
End-Node
I_RFC2409_4_5.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC2409_4_5.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:initiator
XXXX: EUI64 address
Verification Points
ISAKMP Header Format
Cookie field
The cookies MUST NOT swap places when the direction of the ISAKMP SA changes.
(The cookie must be set to Initiator cookie field.)
Next Payload field
Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
(In this test, this field is set as 8(Hash Payload).)
Version field
Major Version 1
Minor Version 0
Exchange Type
indicates the type of exchange being used.
(In this test, this field is set as 32(Quick mode).)
Flags field
Bits of the Flags field(except E,C,A bit) MUST be set to 0 prior to transmission.
|0|0|0|0|0|A|C|E|
Message ID field
Unique Message Identifier used to identify protocol state during Phase 2 negotiations.
Payload Length field
Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
field.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
Upper |
| NUT |
NUT addr |
HOST-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
NUT addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
| HOST-2 |
HOST-2 addr |
NUT addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
HOST-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*NUT addr = NUT address
*HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
Pre-Sequence
In order to start the negotiation of IKE,
NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
* PHASE I
Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Receive the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Send the fourth message from TN
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Send the sixth message from TN
In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) NOTE
(1) HDR; SA; KE; => Begin ISAKMP-SA or
Proxy negotiation
NONCE; IDii and Key Exchange
(2) <= HDR; SA; KE;
NONCE; IDir; AUTH
Initiator Identity
Verified by Responder
Key Generated
Basic SA agreed upon
(3) HDR*; AUTH =>
Responder Identity
Verified by Initiator
SA established
1. Recieve the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). There
can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e. no choices)
in order for the aggressive exchange to work. Keying material used
to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
also transmitted. Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
participation in the exchange. Additionally, the initiator transmits
identification information.
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common
shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
the exchange. Additionally, the responder transmits identification
information. All of this information is transmitted under the
protection of the agreed upon authentication function. Local
security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
protection suite is accepted. One possible action is the
transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
Exchange.
3. Recieve the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
agreed upon authentication function. This information is transmitted
under the protection of the common shared secret. Local security
policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
of an Informational Exchange.
The test sequence is following.
* PHASE II
QUICK MODE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni ========>
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness.
In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly.
In Phase II , the first message's ISAKMP Header Format must be base on
description of RFC(see above Verification Points).
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
3.1 ISAKMP Header Format
(omit)
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Initiator !
! Cookie !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Responder !
! Cookie !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type ! Flags !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Message ID !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(omit)
o Next Payload (1 octet) - Indicates the type of the first payload
in the message. The format for each payload is defined in
sections 3.4 through 3.16. The processing for the payloads is
defined in section 5.
Next Payload Type Value
NONE 0
Security Association (SA) 1
Proposal (P) 2
Transform (T) 3
Key Exchange (KE) 4
Identification (ID) 5
Certificate (CERT) 6
Certificate Request (CR) 7
Hash (HASH) 8
Signature (SIG) 9
Nonce (NONCE) 10
Notification (N) 11
Delete (D) 12
Vendor ID (VID) 13
RESERVED 14 - 127
Private USE 128 - 255
o Major Version (4 bits) - indicates the major version of the ISAKMP
protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of the
ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Major Version to 1.
Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-
Drafts MUST set the Major Version to 0. Implementations SHOULD
never accept packets with a major version number larger than its
own.
o Minor Version (4 bits) - indicates the minor version of the
ISAKMP protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of
the ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Minor Version to 0.
Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-
Drafts MUST set the Minor Version to 1. Implementations SHOULD
never accept packets with a minor version number larger than its
own, given the major version numbers are identical.
o Exchange Type (1 octet) - indicates the type of exchange being
used. This dictates the message and payload orderings in the
ISAKMP exchanges.
Exchange Type Value
NONE 0
Base 1
Identity Protection 2
Authentication Only 3
Aggressive 4
Informational 5
ISAKMP Future Use 6 - 31
DOI Specific Use 32 - 239
Private Use 240 - 255
o Flags (1 octet) - indicates specific options that are set for the
ISAKMP exchange. The flags listed below are specified in the
Flags field beginning with the least significant bit, i.e the
Encryption bit is bit 0 of the Flags field, the Commit bit is bit
1 of the Flags field, and the Authentication Only bit is bit 2 of
the Flags field. The remaining bits of the Flags field MUST be
set to 0 prior to transmission.
(omit)
o Message ID (4 octets) - Unique Message Identifier used to
identify protocol state during Phase 2 negotiations. This value
is randomly generated by the initiator of the Phase 2
negotiation. In the event of simultaneous SA establishments
(i.e. collisions), the value of this field will likely be
different because they are independently generated and, thus, two
security associations will progress toward establishment.
However, it is unlikely there will be absolute simultaneous
establishments. During Phase 1 negotiations, the value MUST be
set to 0.
o Length (4 octets) - Length of total message (header + payloads)
in octets. Encryption can expand the size of an ISAKMP message.
(omit)
5.2 ISAKMP Header Processing
When creating an ISAKMP message, the transmitting entity (initiator
or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Create the respective cookie. See section 2.5.3 for details.
2. Determine the relevant security characteristics of the session
(i.e. DOI and situation).
3. Construct an ISAKMP Header with fields as described in section
3.1.
4. Construct other ISAKMP payloads, depending on the exchange type.
5. Transmit the message to the destination host as described in
section5.1.
(omit)
RFC2409
4. Introduction
(omit)
The ISAKMP SA is bi-directional. That is, once established, either
party may initiate Quick Mode, Informational, and New Group Mode
Exchanges. Per the base ISAKMP document, the ISAKMP SA is identified
by the Initiator's cookie followed by the Responder's cookie-- the
role of each party in the phase 1 exchange dictates which cookie is
the Initiator's. The cookie order established by the phase 1 exchange
continues to identify the ISAKMP SA regardless of the direction the
Quick Mode, Informational, or New Group exchange. In other words, the
cookies MUST NOT swap places when the direction of the ISAKMP SA
changes.
(omit)
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