I_RFC2409_5_1 - [Initiator Test] Implementation of Main Mode with pre-shared key check
End-Node
I_RFC2409_5_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC2409_5_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:initiator
XXXX: EUI64 address
Verification Points
Implementation of Main Mode with pre-shared key check.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
Upper |
| NUT |
NUT addr |
HOST-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
NUT addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
| HOST-2 |
HOST-2 addr |
NUT addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
HOST-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*NUT addr = NUT address
*HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
Pre-Sequence
In order to start the negotiation of IKE,
NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
* PHASE I
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
Judgement (Check *1)
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
Judgement (Check *2)
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
Judgement (Check *3)
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Receive the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Send the fourth message from TN
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Send the sixth message from TN
In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
* PHASE II
QUICK MODE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni ========>
Judgement (Check *4)
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness.
In Phase I, messages must be exchanged correctly.
Check *1
Security Association Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
Check *2
Key Exchange and Nonce Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
Check *3
Identification and Hash Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
In Phase II, the first message must be received.
Check *4
NUT must start Phase II negotiation.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2409
4. Introduction
(omit)
IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
- DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check
(weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in
Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
(omit)
5. Exchanges
There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key
exchange: Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated
keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode
MUST be implemented; Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In
addition, Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate
fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In
addition, New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to
define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations
MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.
(omit)
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