I_RFC3526_2_2 - [Initiator Test] enable PFS with DH5
End-Node
I_RFC3526_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt I_RFC3526_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:initiator
XXXX: EUI64 address
Verification Points
DH Group
IKE implementations support a 1536 bit MODP group.
This group is assigned id 5.
PFS
For PFS to exist the key used to protect transmission of data MUST
NOT be used to derive any additional keys,
and if the key used to protect transmission of data was derived
from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT be used to
derive any more keys.
KE payload
An optional Key Exchange payload can be exchanged to allow for
an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and exponentiation per
Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload with Quick Mode is
optional it MUST be supported.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
DH Group |
PH2 Lt |
Upper |
| NUT |
NUT addr |
HOST-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
NUT addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
5 |
8 Hour |
any |
| HOST-2 |
HOST-2 addr |
NUT addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
HOST-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
5 |
8 Hour |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*NUT addr = NUT address
*HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
Pre-Sequence
In order to start the negotiation of IKE,
NUT transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
* PHASE I
Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Receive the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Send the fourth message from TN
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Send the sixth message from TN
In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) NOTE
(1) HDR; SA; KE; => Begin ISAKMP-SA or
Proxy negotiation
NONCE; IDii and Key Exchange
(2) <= HDR; SA; KE;
NONCE; IDir; AUTH
Initiator Identity
Verified by Responder
Key Generated
Basic SA agreed upon
(3) HDR*; AUTH =>
Responder Identity
Verified by Initiator
SA established
1. Recieve the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). There
can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e. no choices)
in order for the aggressive exchange to work. Keying material used
to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
also transmitted. Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
participation in the exchange. Additionally, the initiator transmits
identification information.
2. Send the second message from TN
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common
shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
the exchange. Additionally, the responder transmits identification
information. All of this information is transmitted under the
protection of the agreed upon authentication function. Local
security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
protection suite is accepted. One possible action is the
transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
Exchange.
3. Recieve the third message from NUT
In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
agreed upon authentication function. This information is transmitted
under the protection of the common shared secret. Local security
policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
of an Informational Exchange.
The test sequence is following.
* PHASE II
QUICK MODE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni,KE ========>
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness.KE is keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret.
In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly.
In Phase II , the first message which has KE payload and DH5 as SA attribute
must be received.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2409
3.3 Perfect Forward Secrecy
When used in the memo Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) refers to the
notion that compromise of a single key will permit access to only
data protected by a single key. For PFS to exist the key used to
protect transmission of data MUST NOT be used to derive any
additional keys, and if the key used to protect transmission of data
was derived from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT
be used to derive any more keys.
Perfect Forward Secrecy for both keys and identities is provided in
this protocol. (Sections 5.5 and 8).
(omit)
5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
(omit)
Quick Mode is essentially a SA negotiation and an exchange of nonces
that provides replay protection. The nonces are used to generate
fresh key material and prevent replay attacks from generating bogus
security associations. An optional Key Exchange payload can be
exchanged to allow for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and
exponentiation per Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload
with Quick Mode is optional it MUST be supported.
(omit)
RFC3526
2. 1536-bit MODP Group
The 1536 bit MODP group has been used for the implementations for
quite a long time, but was not defined in RFC 2409 (IKE).
Implementations have been using group 5 to designate this group, we
standardize that practice here.
The prime is: 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 }
Its hexadecimal value is:
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D
C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F
83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
The generator is: 2.
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