NAME

  R_A_RFC2407_4_2_1_2 - [Responder Test] Not include Identification Payload

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  R_A_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_A_RFC2407_4_2_1_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

Network Topology

        HOST-2(TN):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
          |                     
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   |
                 ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
                   |
Net-z   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
        NUT:responder
  

  XXXX: EUI64 address

Verification Points

     All IPSEC DOI implementations MUST support SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY
     by including an Identification Payload in at least one of 
     the Phase I Oakley exchanges and MUST abort any association setup
     that does not include an Identification Payload.

Configuration

       Initiator(TN) does not send ID payload by the the fifth message.
       Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
          
          
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II             
                       
                       
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            Upper
          
          
            NUT           
            NUT addr           
            HOST-2 addr           
            Aggressive 
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour           
            NUT addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Transport           
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour          
            any           
             
             
            HOST-2
            HOST-2 addr
            NUT addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            HOST-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Transport
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            any
          
          
          
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *NUT addr = NUT address
          *HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>                                     <----not include ID payload(invalid)


(2)                      X <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <-----Must not transmit


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function).

JUDGEMENT

      The first message must not be accepted. And the second message must not be returned.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2407
  4.2.1 SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY


   The SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY type specifies that the security association
   will be identified by source identity information present in an
   associated Identification Payload.  See Section 4.6.2 for a complete
   description of the various Identification types.  All IPSEC DOI
   implementations MUST support SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY by including an
   Identification Payload in at least one of the Phase I Oakley
   exchanges ([IKE], Section 5) and MUST abort any association setup
   that does not include an Identification Payload.