NAME

  R_A_RFC2408_5_3_1 - [Responder Test]cookie field check

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  R_A_RFC2408_5_3_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_A_RFC2408_5_3_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


           the first AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <---- #1 : responder cookie


(3)  HDR[*]; HASH_I        ========>
                        Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function). 


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the results of the 
      agreed upon authentication function(hash function). 


 10sec after the first AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE, 
 negotiation of IKE(the second AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE) is started.


           The second AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <---- #2 : responder cookie
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function).

JUDGEMENT

        In the first AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE,
        the first to the third message must be exchanged correctly.
        In the second AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE,
        The first message must be accepted. And the second message's responder cookie(#2)
        is not same as the first AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE's responder cookie(#1).

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  4.3 Security Association Modification


   Security Association modification within ISAKMP is accomplished by
   creating a new SA and initiating communications using that new SA.
   Deletion of the old SA can be done anytime after the new SA is
   established.  Deletion of the old SA is dependent on local security
   policy.  Modification of SAs by using a "Create New SA followed by
   Delete Old SA" method is done to avoid potential vulnerabilities in
   synchronizing modification of existing SA attributes.  The procedure
   for creating new SAs is outlined in section 4.2.  The procedure for
   deleting SAs is outlined in section 5.15.


   Modification of an ISAKMP SA (phase 1 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of an ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship
   between the two SAs and the initiator and responder cookie pairs
   SHOULD be different, as outlined in section 2.5.3.


   Modification of a Protocol SA (phase 2 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of a Protocol SA. The creation of a new SA is
   protected by the existing ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship between
   the two Protocol SAs.  A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
   the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
   support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
   traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA. As
   stated previously in this section, deletion of an old SA is then
   dependent on local security policy.


   (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility