R_A_RFC2409_4_8 - [Responder Test]Transform payload SA Attributes check (3DES,SHA,RSA sign,DH2)
End-Node
R_A_RFC2409_4_8.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_A_RFC2409_4_8.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
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Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
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Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:responder
XXXX: EUI64 address
| Parameter | Value | |
| ISAKMP | SA Attributes | - 3DES in CBC mode - SHA - RSA signatures. - MODP over group number two. |
| Machine | Src | Dest | Phase I | Phase II | ||||||||||||
| Ex mode | Key Value | Enc Alg | Hash Alg | Auth Method | DH Group | PH1 Lt | IDx | Proto ID | Trans ID | Mode | Auth Alg | PH2 Lt | Upper | |||
| NUT | NUT addr | HOST-2 addr | Aggressive | 3DES | SHA | RSA signatures | 2 | 8 Hour | NUT addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Transport | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | any | |
| HOST-2 | HOST-2 addr | NUT addr | Aggressive | 3DES | SHA | RSA signatures | 2 | 8 Hour | HOST-2 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Transport | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | any | |
This test check is following.
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, SIG_R Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator transmits identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder transmits identification information and signed data, SIG_R is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_R.
The first message must be accepted. And the second message must be returned.
The second message Attributes(3DES:1,SHA:2,RSA sign:3,DH2:2) must be correct.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2409 4.Introduction
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IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
- DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption; Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA] signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and MODP group number 2. IKE implementations MAY support any additional encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and EC2N groups.
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