NAME

  R_A_RFC2409_5_13_2 - [Responder Test]Key Exchange Payload Format check(DH2)

TARGET

  End-Node

SYNOPSIS

  R_A_RFC2409_5_13_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_A_RFC2409_5_13_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option

  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R
                        Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function).

JUDGEMENT

        The first message must be accepted. 
        And the second message's Key Exchange Payload Format must be base 
        on description of RFC(see above Verification Points).
        And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408 
  5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing


   When creating any of the ISAKMP Payloads described in sections 3.4
   through 3.15 a Generic Payload Header is placed at the beginning of
   these payloads.  When creating the Generic Payload Header, the
   transmitting entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
       These values are described in section 3.1.


   2.  Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.


   3.  Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
       field.


   4.  Construct the payloads as defined in the remainder of this
       section.


  (omit)


  5.7 Key Exchange Payload Processing


   When creating a Key Exchange Payload, the transmitting entity
   (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine the Key Exchange to be used as defined by the DOI.


   2.  Determine the usage of the Key Exchange Data field as defined by
       the DOI.


   3.  Construct a Key Exchange payload.


   4.  Transmit the message to the receiving entity as described in
       section 5.1.


  (omit)


  RFC2409 
  5. Exchanges


  (omit)


   The Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a KE payload, in either a
   phase 1 or phase 2 exchange, MUST be the length of the negotiated
   Diffie-Hellman group enforced, if necessary, by pre-pending the value
   with zeros.


  (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility