R_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG - [Responder Test] Invalid Signature Payload Format(Not include Signature Data field) check
End-Node
R_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt R_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
|
ROUTER-1(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::11
|
Net-z --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100:XXXX
NUT:responder
XXXX: EUI64 address
Verification Points
Determine if the Signature is supported. If the Signature
determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in
the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to
the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a
system security policy.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder generate the public key and the secret key.
Initiator and Responder exchange the certificate of each other.
Signature Payload Format(HOST-2:Initiator)
Signature Data field : not include this field (invalid)
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
Upper |
| NUT |
NUT addr |
HOST-2 addr |
Main |
|
3DES |
SHA |
RSA signatures |
2 |
8 Hour |
NUT addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
| HOST-2 |
HOST-2 addr |
NUT addr |
Main |
|
3DES |
SHA |
RSA signatures |
2 |
8 Hour |
HOST-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Transport |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*NUT addr = NUT address
*HOST-2 addr = HOST-2 address
This test check is following.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; SIG_I ========> <-----Signature Data field : not include this field(invalid)
(6-A) X <======== HDR*; IDir; SIG_R <----Must not transmit
or
(6-B) <======== HDR*; HASH(1); N/D
(HDR; N/D)
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function. The signed data, SIG_I is the result of the negotiated
digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I.
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
In the sixth message (6-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
The first to the fourth message must be exchanged correctly.
The fifth message must not be accepted.
And the sixth message(6-A) must not be returned
(* or INVALID-SIGNATURE message(6-B) is returned).
*option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
5.12 Signature Payload Processing
(omit)
When a Signature payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator
or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine if the Signature is supported. If the Signature
determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in
the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to
the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a
system security policy.
2. Perform the Signature function as outlined in the DOI and/or Key
Exchange protocol documents. If the Signature function fails,
the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID SIGNATURE VALUE, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message type MAY be
sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by
a system security policy.
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