NAME

  SG_I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2 - [Initiator Test] Invalid Identification Payload receive

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC2407_4_6_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, 
                                           Nr, IDir, HASH_R <----ID protocol/port : TCP/300(invalid value)


(3)  HDR[*]; HASH_I        ========> X                      <-----Must not transmit
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function). 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the results of the 
      agreed upon authentication function(hash function).

JUDGEMENT

      The second message must not be accepted. And the third message(3) must not be returned.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2407
  4.6.2 Identification Payload Content


   The Identification Payload is used to identify the initiator of the
   Security Association.  The identity of the initiator SHOULD be used
   by the responder to determine the correct host system security policy
   requirement for the association.  For example, a host might choose to
   require authentication and integrity without confidentiality (AH)
   from a certain set of IP addresses and full authentication with
   confidentiality (ESP) from another range of IP addresses.  The
   Identification Payload provides information that can be used by the
   responder to make this decision.


   During Phase I negotiations, the ID port and protocol fields MUST be
   set to zero or to UDP port 500.  If an implementation receives any
   other values, this MUST be treated as an error and the security
   association setup MUST be aborted.  This event SHOULD be auditable.


   The following diagram illustrates the content of the Identification
   Payload.


    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !  Next Payload !   RESERVED    !        Payload Length         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !   ID Type     !  Protocol ID  !             Port              !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                     Identification Data                       ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


(omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility