NAME

  SG_I_A_RFC2408_3_1_1_Mj_2 - [Initiator Test] Check the Major Version fields to confirm they are correct

TARGET

SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_I_A_RFC2408_3_1_1_Mj_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC2408_3_1_1_Mj_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

Network Topology

                                 HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

Verification Points

    Implementation SHOULD never accept packets with a major version number 
larger than its own.
    
Check the Major and Minor Version fields to confirm they are
correct (see section 3.1).  If the Version field validation
fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are
taken:
       (a)  The event, INVALID ISAKMP VERSION, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.
       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION or INVALID-MINOR-
            VERSION message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity.
            This action is dictated by a system security policy.

Configuration

       ISAKMP Header Format(HOST-2:responder)
          Major Version : 15 (invalid value)
          Minor Version : 0
       Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
          
          
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
                       
                       
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
          
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP 
            ESP_3DES          
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour            
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any            
             
             
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA
            8 Hour  
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any
          
          
        
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address

Pre-Sequence

       In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, 
                                           Nr, IDir, HASH_R <-----Major Version : 15(invalid)


(3-A)HDR[*]; HASH_I        ========> X                      <-----Must not transmit
         or
(3-B)HDR*; HASH(1); N/D    ========> 
     (HDR; N/D)
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function). 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third message (3-B), the initiator indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.

JUDGEMENT

      The second message must not be accepted. And the third message(3-A) must not be returned 
      (* or INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION message(3-B) is returned).
      *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  3.1 ISAKMP Header Format 


(omit)


                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                          Initiator                            !
    !                            Cookie                             !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                          Responder                            !
    !                            Cookie                             !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !  Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type !     Flags     !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                          Message ID                           !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                            Length                             !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


(omit)


    o  Major Version (4 bits) - indicates the major version of the ISAKMP
       protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of the
       ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Major Version to 1.
       Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-
       Drafts MUST set the Major Version to 0.  Implementations SHOULD
       never accept packets with a major version number larger than its
       own.


    o  Minor Version (4 bits) - indicates the minor version of the
       ISAKMP protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of
       the ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Minor Version to 0.
       Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-
       Drafts MUST set the Minor Version to 1.  Implementations SHOULD
       never accept packets with a minor version number larger than its
       own, given the major version numbers are identical.


(omit)


  5.2 ISAKMP Header Processing


   When creating an ISAKMP message, the transmitting entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Create the respective cookie.  See section 2.5.3 for details.


   2.  Determine the relevant security characteristics of the session
       (i.e. DOI and situation).


   3.  Construct an ISAKMP Header with fields as described in section
       3.1.


   4.  Construct other ISAKMP payloads, depending on the exchange type.


   5.  Transmit the message to the destination host as described in
       section5.1.


   When an ISAKMP message is received, the receiving entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Verify the Initiator and Responder "cookies".  If the cookie
       validation fails, the message is discarded and the following
       actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID COOKIE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-COOKIE message type MAY be sent to
            the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   2.  Check the Next Payload field to confirm it is valid.  If the Next
       Payload field validation fails, the message is discarded and the
       following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID NEXT PAYLOAD, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   3.  Check the Major and Minor Version fields to confirm they are
       correct (see section 3.1).  If the Version field validation
       fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are


       (a)  The event, INVALID ISAKMP VERSION, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION or INVALID-MINOR-
            VERSION message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity.
            This action is dictated by a system security policy.


   4.  Check the Exchange Type field to confirm it is valid.  If the
       Exchange Type field validation fails, the message is discarded
       and the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID EXCHANGE TYPE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE message type MAY be
            sent to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by
            a system security policy.


   5.  Check the Flags field to ensure it contains correct values.  If
       the Flags field validation fails, the message is discarded and
       the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID FLAGS, MAY be logged in the appropriate
            systemaudit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-FLAGS message type MAY be sent to the
            transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a system
            security policy.


   6.  Check the Message ID field to ensure it contains correct values.
       If the Message ID validation fails, the message is discarded and
       the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID MESSAGE ID, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-MESSAGE-ID message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   7.  Processing of the ISAKMP message continues using the value in the
       Next Payload field.


(omit)