NAME

  SG_I_A_RFC2408_5_11_1 - [Initiator Test] HASH Payload Format check

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_I_A_RFC2408_5_11_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC2408_5_11_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R


(3)  HDR[*]; HASH_I        ========>
                       Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function). 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the results of the 
      agreed upon authentication function(hash function).

JUDGEMENT

       The first to the second message must be exchanged correctly.
       The third message's HASH Payload Format must be base 
       on description of RFC(see above Verification Points).
       And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing


   When creating any of the ISAKMP Payloads described in sections 3.4
   through 3.15 a Generic Payload Header is placed at the beginning of
   these payloads.  When creating the Generic Payload Header, the
   transmitting entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
       These values are described in section 3.1.


   2.  Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.


   3.  Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
       field.


   4.  Construct the payloads as defined in the remainder of this
       section.


  (omit)


  5.11 Hash Payload Processing


   When creating a Hash Payload, the transmitting entity (initiator or
   responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine the Hash function to be used as defined by the SA
       negotiation.


   2.  Determine the usage of the Hash Data field as defined by the DOI.


   3.  Construct a Hash payload.


   4.  Transmit the message to the receiving entity as described in
       section 5.1.


  (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility