SG_I_A_RFC2409_4_8_2 - [Initiator Test] Transform payload SA Attributes check (PSK)
SGW
SG_I_A_RFC2409_4_8_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC2409_4_8_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
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|
SGW-2(TN):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
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Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
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ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
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Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
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| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
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Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
| Parameter | Value | |
| ISAKMP | SA Attributes | - DES in CBC mode - MD5 - Authentication via pre-shared keys. - MODP over default group number one. |
| Machine | Src | Dest | Phase I | Phase II | ||||||||||||||
| Ex mode | Key Value | Enc Alg | Hash Alg | Auth Method | DH Group | PH1 Lt | IDx | Proto ID | Trans ID | Mode | Auth Alg | PH2 Lt | IDci | IDcr | Upper | |||
| SGW-1 | SGW-1 addr | SGW-2 addr | Aggressive | IKE-TEST | 3DES* | SHA* | pre-shared key | 2* | 8 Hour | SGW-1 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-z addr | Net-v addr | any |
| SGW-2 | SGW-2 addr | SGW-1 addr | Aggressive | IKE-TEST | 3DES | SHA | pre-shared key | 2 | 8 Hour | SGW-2 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-z addr | Net-v addr | any |
In order to start the negotiation of IKE,
TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
This test check is following.
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(NUT) Direction Responder(TN) (1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========> Judgement (Check *1)
1. Receive the first message from NUT In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator transmits identification information.
The first message Attributes(PSK:1) must be included.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2409 4.Introduction
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IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
- DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption; Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA] signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and MODP group number 2. IKE implementations MAY support any additional encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and EC2N groups.
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perldoc V6evalTool
IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility