#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_I_A_RFC2409_5_19.seq,v 1.15.2.3 2005/11/22 10:06:02 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_I_A_RFC2409_5_19.seq,v 1.15.2.3 2005/11/22 10:06:02 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF1 = Link1; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET1_HOST2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => 'des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'md5', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_enc_alg_2' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg_2' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method_2' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group_2' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '2', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'out', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie and nonce ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'} = $nonce; vLogHTML("CKY-R: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("Nr-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_r'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- $IKE::pktdesc{'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'} = 'Send Echo Request from Host-1(TN) to Host-2(TN) via SGW1(NUT)'; my $ret0 = packetSendOnly($IF1, 'echo_request_send_net0host1_net4host2'); if($ret0 == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret1 = ikePh1Recv_agg($IF0, 10, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); $cpp=' -DINVALID_PHASE1_SEND_2ND_TRANSFORM '; my %ret2 = ikePh1Send2nd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } if($IKE::NOTIFY_CHECK eq undef){ @ike=(); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 3rd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(8); #Hash payload $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; %ret3 = ikePh1Recv3rd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret3{'status'} == $IKE::PASS) { vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("NG:Phase-1 3rd message is returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); }else{ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("OK:Phase-1 3rd message is not returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); } }else{ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 Notify recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'PAYLOAD-MALFORMED'}); my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'ALL'}); my $encryptiontype= '2'; $cpp=$ikeConfig{'cpp_phase1_recv_1st'}; %pktdesc = ( %pktdesc, 'isakmp_phase1_recv' => 'Recv 1st message from HOST1(NUT)' ); @ike = ( @ike, 'isakmp_phase1_recv' ); %ret = ikeRecvNotify($IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@notifyMessageID,$encryptiontype); if($ret{'status'} >= 2) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Multiple Transform Payloads check(modify proposal) is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_I_A_RFC2409_5_19 - [Initiator Test] Multiple Transform Payloads check(modify proposal) =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_I_A_RFC2409_5_19.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_A_RFC2409_5_19.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points

             
    • If the initiator of an exchange notices that attribute values 
have changed or attributes have been added or deleted from an 
offer made, that response MUST be rejected.
      • 
	   
    • The initiator MUST verify that the Security Association payload
received from the responder matches one of the proposals sent initially.
      •

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
Any attribute is acceptable as proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value
            Trans #
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg 
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
            IKE-TEST
            1
            DES           
            MD5           
            pre-shared key           
            2
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour            
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any            
          
      
             
         
             
             
             
             
             
            2      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
                 
             
             
             
             
              
             
          
      
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Aggressive
            IKE-TEST 
                  
            65000
            65000
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA
            8 Hour 
            Net-z addr          
            Net-v addr   
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *Trans # = Transform number
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address

  • Pre-Sequence

    •        In order to start the negotiation of IKE, 
       TN(HOST-1) transmits Echo Request to TN(HOST-2).
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)         Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, 
                                           Nr, IDir, HASH_R <-----modify proposal(invalid)


(3)  HDR[*]; HASH_I        ========> X                      <-----Must not transmit
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the results of the agreed
      upon authentication function(hash function). 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the results of the 
      agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The second message must not be accepted. And the third message(3) must not be returned. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2408
  4.2 Security Association Establishment


(omit)


   When responding to a Security Association payload, the responder MUST
   send a Security Association payload with the selected proposal, which
   may consist of multiple Proposal payloads and their associated
   Transform payloads.  Each of the Proposal payloads MUST contain a
   single Transform payload associated with the Protocol.  The responder
   SHOULD retain the Proposal # field in the Proposal payload and the
   Transform # field in each Transform payload of the selected Proposal.
   Retention of Proposal and Transform numbers should speed the
   initiator's protocol processing by negating the need to compare the
   respondor's selection with every offered option.  These values enable
   the initiator to perform the comparison directly and quickly.  The
   initiator MUST verify that the Security Association payload received
   from the responder matches one of the proposals sent initially.


  RFC2409
  5. Exchanges


(omit)


   During security association negotiation, initiators present offers
   for potential security associations to responders. Responders MUST
   NOT modify attributes of any offer, attribute encoding excepted (see
   Appendix A).  If the initiator of an exchange notices that attribute
   values have changed or attributes have been added or deleted from an
   offer made, that response MUST be rejected.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut