NAME

  SG_I_RFC2408_5_9_2_1_C - [Initiator Test] Invalid Certificate Payload(Certificate Encoding is incorrect) check

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_I_RFC2408_5_9_2_1_C.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_I_RFC2408_5_9_2_1_C.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(NUT)     Direction      Responder(TN)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE; CERT Req


(5)  HDR*; IDii; CERT;
       CERT Req; SIG_I  ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; CERT; SIG_R  <----Cert Encoding field : 255(invalid)


(7)  HDR*; HASH(1); N/D ========>                              <----must not start Phase II  
     (HDR; N/D)     
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Receive the first message from NUT
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Send the second message from TN
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Receive the third message from NUT
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Send the fourth message from TN
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
      Additionally the responder send Certificate Request Payload.


   5. Receive the fifth message from NUT
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_I is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I.
      Additionally the initiator send Certificate and Certificate
      Request Payload


   6. Send the sixth message from TN
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_R is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_R.
      Additionally the responder send Certificate Request Payload.


   7. Receive the seventh message from NUT
      In the seventh message (7), the initiator indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.

JUDGEMENT

      The first and the fifth message must be exchanged correctly.
      The sixth message must not be accepted. And the seventh message 
      must not be returned (* or INVALID-CERT-ENCODING message is returned).
      (Not establish ISAKMP SA, Not start negotiation of Phase II).
      *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.9 Certificate Payload Processing


(omit)


   When a Certificate payload is received, the receiving entity
   (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine if the Certificate Encoding is supported.  If the
       Certificate Encoding is not supported, the payload is discarded
       and the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID CERTIFICATE TYPE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-CERT-ENCODING message type MAY be
            sent to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by
            a system security policy.


   2.  Process the Certificate Data field.  If the Certificate Data is
       invalid or improperly formatted, the payload is discarded and the
       following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID CERTIFICATE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-CERTIFICATE message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility