SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG - [Responder Test] Signature Payload Format check
SGW
SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
|
|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
|
Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
|
|
ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
|
Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
Verification Points
Signature Payload Format
Next Payload field
Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
RESERVED Fields
All RESERVED fields in the ISAKMP protocol MUST be set to zero (0).
Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.
Payload Length field
Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
field.
Signature Data field
Data that results from applying the digital signature function
to the ISAKMP message and/or state.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder generate the public key and the secret key
Initiator and Responder exchange the certificate of each other.
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
IDci |
IDcr |
Upper |
| SGW-1 |
SGW-1 addr |
SGW-2 addr |
Aggressive |
|
3DES |
SHA |
RSA signatures |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-1 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
| SGW-2 |
SGW-2 addr |
SGW-1 addr |
Aggressive |
|
3DES |
SHA |
RSA signatures |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*IDci = identity payload
*IDcr = identity payload
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
*SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
*Net-z = Net-z network address
*Net-v = Net-v network address
This test check is following.
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, SIG_R
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random
information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator
transmits identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random
information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder
transmits identification information and the signed data, SIG_R is
the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied
to HASH_R.
The second message's Signature Payload Format must be base
on description of RFC(see above Verification Points).
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing
When creating any of the ISAKMP Payloads described in sections 3.4
through 3.15 a Generic Payload Header is placed at the beginning of
these payloads. When creating the Generic Payload Header, the
transmitting entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
These values are described in section 3.1.
2. Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.
3. Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
field.
4. Construct the payloads as defined in the remainder of this
section.
(omit)
5.12 Signature Payload Processing
When creating a Signature Payload, the transmitting entity (initiator
or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine the Signature function to be used as defined by the SA
negotiation.
2. Determine the usage of the Signature Data field as defined by the
DOI.
3. Construct a Signature payload.
4. Transmit the message to the receiving entity as described in
section 5.1.
(omit)
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