#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.seq,v 1.13.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:05 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.seq,v 1.13.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:05 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; my $IF1 = Link1; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'rsasig', 'isakmp_certificate_type' => 'x509', 'isakmp_certificate_file' => 'NUTcert.pem', 'isakmp_privkey_file' => 'NUTprivkey.pem', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'asn1dn', # 'isakmp_src_id' => "root\@nut.com", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'asn1dn', # 'isakmp_dst_id' => "root\@tn.com", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_send_id' => 'on', 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'in', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', 'ipsec_p_send_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p_send_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_p_select_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p_select_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p_select_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p_select_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; my $nonce_1 = '00000000000000000000000000000001'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'} = $nonce; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_i'} = $nonce_1; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'} = 4096; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_message_id'} = '0000ffff'; #====== set other date about this test ======== #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $cpp = "-DPHASE1_SEND_1st_IDDER"; my %ret1 = ikePh1Send1st_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret2 = ikePh1Recv2nd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 3rd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); $cpp = ' -DINVALID_PHASE1_SEND_3rd_DSIG '; my %ret3 = ikePh1Send3rd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig); if($ret3{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } if($IKE::NOTIFY_CHECK ne undef){ #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 Notify recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @notifyMessageID=($IKE::notify_messages{'INVALID-SIGNATURE'}); my $encryptiontype= '1'; $cpp=$ikeConfig{'cpp_phase1_recv_2nd'}; %pktdesc = ( %pktdesc, 'isakmp_phase1_recv_2nd' => 'Recv 2nd message from HOST1(NUT)' ); @ike = ( @ike, 'isakmp_phase1_recv_2nd' ); my %ret_notify = ikeRecvNotify($IF0, 5, 0, 1, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret3, \%ikeConfig,\@notifyMessageID,$encryptiontype); if($ret_notify{'status'} >= 2) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } } @ike = (); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); my %ret1 = ikePh2Send1st($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-2 2nd message recv ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret2 = ikePh2Recv2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::PASS) { vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("NG:Phase-2 2nd message is returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); }else{ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("OK:Phase-2 2nd message is not returned.
"); vLogHTML(''); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML(" Invalid Signature Payload Format(Not include Signature Data field) is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG - [Responder Test] Invalid Signature Payload Format(Not include Signature Data field) check =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_12_2_1_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points
    •        Determine if the Signature is supported.  If the Signature
       determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
       actions are taken:
    
       (a)  The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in
            the appropriate system audit file.
    
       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to
            the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder generate the public key and the secret key.
      • 
       
    • Initiator and Responder exchange the certificate of each other.
      • 
       
    • Signature Payload Format(HOST-2:Initiator)
      • 
          Signature Data field : not include this field (invalid)
       
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Aggressive  
                                           
            3DES           
            SHA           
            RSA signatures           
            2           
            8 Hour            
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            Net-v addr          
            Net-z addr   
            any            
          
         
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Aggressive
                  
            3DES
            SHA
            RSA signatures           
            2           
            8 Hour
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            Net-v addr          
            Net-z addr   
            any
          
      
                
          
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>


(2)                        <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, SIG_R


(3)  HDR[*]; SIG_I         ========>                                    <-----Signature Data field : not include this field(invalid)


(4)                        <========       HDR*; HASH(1); N/D
                                           (HDR; N/D)
                        Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
      replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder 
      transmits identification information and the signed data, SIG_R is 
      the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_R.


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send the signed data, SIG_I 
      is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied 
      to HASH_I.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the second message (4), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.




 * PHASE II


                      QUICK MODE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR*, HASH(1), 
           SA, Ni       ========>


(2)                   X <========     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr         <-----Must not transmit
                Judgement (Check *2)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the 
      message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire 
      message that follows the hash including all payload headers, 
      but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
      HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
      minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
      complete message. Nonce is random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE, the first to the second message must be exchanged correctly. The third message must not be accepted. And must not establish ISAKMP SA(In QUICK MODE, the second message must not transmit(Check *2) (* or INVALID-SIGNATURE message(4) may be returned(Check *1)).) *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2408
  5.12 Signature Payload Processing


(omit)


   When a Signature payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine if the Signature is supported.  If the Signature
       determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
       actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in
            the appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to
            the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   2.  Perform the Signature function as outlined in the DOI and/or Key
       Exchange protocol documents.  If the Signature function fails,
       the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID SIGNATURE VALUE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message type MAY be
            sent to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by
            a system security policy.
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut