NAME

  SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_2_P1_2_HEADER - [Responder Test] Check the Next Payload field to confirm it is valid

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_2_P1_2_HEADER.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_2_P1_2_HEADER.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


                       AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)         Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>                                     <-----Next Payload field(ISAKMP Header) : 127(invalid)


(2-A)                    X <========       HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <-----Must not transmit
                                       or
(2-B)                      <========       HDR; N/D
                        Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random 
      information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against 
      replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator 
      transmits identification information.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
      Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.

JUDGEMENT

      The first message must not be accepted. And the second message(2-A) must not be returned 
      (* or INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE message(2-B) is returned).
      *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.2 ISAKMP Header Processing


   When creating an ISAKMP message, the transmitting entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Create the respective cookie.  See section 2.5.3 for details.


   2.  Determine the relevant security characteristics of the session
       (i.e. DOI and situation).


   3.  Construct an ISAKMP Header with fields as described in section
       3.1.


   4.  Construct other ISAKMP payloads, depending on the exchange type.


   5.  Transmit the message to the destination host as described in
       section5.1.


   When an ISAKMP message is received, the receiving entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Verify the Initiator and Responder "cookies".  If the cookie
       validation fails, the message is discarded and the following
       actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID COOKIE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-COOKIE message type MAY be sent to
            the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   2.  Check the Next Payload field to confirm it is valid.  If the Next
       Payload field validation fails, the message is discarded and the
       following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID NEXT PAYLOAD, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   3.  Check the Major and Minor Version fields to confirm they are
       correct (see section 3.1).  If the Version field validation
       fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are


       (a)  The event, INVALID ISAKMP VERSION, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION or INVALID-MINOR-
            VERSION message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity.
            This action is dictated by a system security policy.


   4.  Check the Exchange Type field to confirm it is valid.  If the
       Exchange Type field validation fails, the message is discarded
       and the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID EXCHANGE TYPE, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE message type MAY be
            sent to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by
            a system security policy.


   5.  Check the Flags field to ensure it contains correct values.  If
       the Flags field validation fails, the message is discarded and
       the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID FLAGS, MAY be logged in the appropriate
            systemaudit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-FLAGS message type MAY be sent to the
            transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a system
            security policy.


   6.  Check the Message ID field to ensure it contains correct values.
       If the Message ID validation fails, the message is discarded and
       the following actions are taken:


       (a)  The event, INVALID MESSAGE ID, MAY be logged in the
            appropriate system audit file.


       (b)  An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
            containing the INVALID-MESSAGE-ID message type MAY be sent
            to the transmitting entity.  This action is dictated by a
            system security policy.


   7.  Processing of the ISAKMP message continues using the value in the
       Next Payload field.


 (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility