SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_3_2_P1_2_GENERIC - [Responder Test] Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero
SGW
SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_3_2_P1_2_GENERIC.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_A_RFC2408_5_3_2_P1_2_GENERIC.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
|
|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
|
Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
|
|
ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
|
Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
Verification Points
Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero. If the value
in the RESERVED field is not zero, the message is discarded and
the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID RESERVED FIELD, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED
message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This
action is dictated by a system security policy.
Configuration
SA Payload Format(HOST-2:Initiator)
RESERVED field : 1 (set to not zero, invalid value)
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
IDci |
IDcr |
Upper |
| SGW-1 |
SGW-1 addr |
SGW-2 addr |
Aggressive |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-1 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
| SGW-2 |
SGW-2 addr |
SGW-1 addr |
Aggressive |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*IDci = identity payload
*IDcr = identity payload
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
*SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
*Net-z = Net-z network address
*Net-v = Net-v network address
This test check is following.
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========> <-----RESERVED field : 1(SA, invalid value)
(2-A) X <======== HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R <-----Must not transmit
or
(2-B) <======== HDR; N/D
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random
information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against
replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator
transmits identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
The first message must not be accepted. And the second message(2-A) must not be returned
(* or BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED message(2-B) is returned).
*option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing
(omit)
When any of the ISAKMP Payloads are received, the receiving entity
(initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Check the Next Payload field to confirm it is valid. If the Next
Payload field validation fails, the message is discarded and the
following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID NEXT PAYLOAD, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE message type MAY be sent
to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a
system security policy.
2. Verify the RESERVED field contains the value zero. If the value
in the RESERVED field is not zero, the message is discarded and
the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID RESERVED FIELD, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX or PAYLOAD-MALFORMED
message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This
action is dictated by a system security policy.
3. Process the remaining payloads as defined by the Next Payload
field.
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