#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_A_RFC2409_6_2_1.seq,v 1.16.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:06 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_R_A_RFC2409_6_2_1.seq,v 1.16.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:06 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } END{ } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; my $IF1 = Link1; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'aggressive', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '1', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'in', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'} = $nonce; #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); %ret2 = ikePh1Send1st_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'SAAttributeCheck'}; my %ret = ikePh1Recv2nd_agg($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Transform payload SA Attributes(3DES,SHA,PSK,DH1) is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_R_A_RFC2409_6_2_1 - [Responder Test]Transform payload SA Attributes check (3DES,SHA,PSK,DH1) =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html
  SG_R_A_RFC2409_6_2_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_A_RFC2409_6_2_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
  •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                       |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                       |
    Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
              |
              |
             SGW-2(TN):initiator
              |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
              |                     
    Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                       |
                       |
                      ROUTER-2(TN)
                       | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                       |
    Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
              |
              |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
             SGW-1(NUT):responder
              |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
              |
    Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                       |
                       | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                      ROUTER-1(TN)
                       |
                       |
    Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                       |
                                       |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                     HOST-1(TN)
      

  • Verification Points
    • IKE implementations SHOULD support the following attribute values
      Parameter Value
      ISAKMP SA Attributes - 3DES in CBC mode
      - SHA
      - Authentication via pre-shared keys.
      - MODP over default group number one.

  • Configuration
    •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
    • At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
      Machine Src Dest Phase I Phase II
      Ex mode Key Value Enc Alg Hash Alg Auth Method DH Group PH1 Lt IDx

      Proto ID Trans ID Mode Auth Alg PH2 Lt IDci IDcr Upper
      SGW-1 SGW-1 addr SGW-2 addr Aggressive IKE-TEST 3DES SHA pre-shared key 1 8 Hour SGW-1 addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Tunnel HMAC-SHA 8 Hour Net-v addr Net-z addr any
      SGW-2 SGW-2 addr SGW-1 addr Aggressive IKE-TEST 3DES SHA pre-shared key 1 8 Hour SGW-2 addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Tunnel HMAC-SHA 8 Hour Net-v addr Net-z addr any
      *Ex Mode = Exchange mode *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx) *IDci = identity payload *IDcr = identity payload *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm *Key Value = pre-shared key value *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier *Trans ID = Transform Identifier *Mode = Encapsulation Mode *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm *Auth Method = Authentication Method *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address *Net-z = Net-z network address *Net-v = Net-v network address
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html
  This test check is following.

AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA, KE, Ni, IDii ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are also transmitted. Additionally, the initiator transmits identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.Additionally, the responder transmits identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The first message must be accepted. And the second message must be returned. The second message Attributes(3DES:5,SHA:2,PSK:1,DH1:1) must be correct. And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html
  RFC2409 
  4.Introduction

(omit)
IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
-DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption; Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA] signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and MODP group number 2. IKE implementations MAY support any additional encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and EC2N groups.
(omit)
6.1 First Oakley Default Group
Oakley implementations MUST support a MODP group with the following prime and generator. This group is assigned id 1 (one).
The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 } Its hexadecimal value is
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
The generator is: 2.
(omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut