NAME

  SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG - [Responder Test] Signature Payload Format check

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_1_1_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii; SIG_I  ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; SIG_R
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Send the fifth message from TN
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_I is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I.


   6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_R is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_R.

JUDGEMENT

        The first to the fourth message must be exchanged correctly.
        The fifth message must be accepted. 
        And the sixth message's Signature Payload Format must be base 
        on description of RFC(see above Verification Points).
        And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.3 Generic Payload Header Processing


   When creating any of the ISAKMP Payloads described in sections 3.4
   through 3.15 a Generic Payload Header is placed at the beginning of
   these payloads.  When creating the Generic Payload Header, the
   transmitting entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Place the value of the Next Payload in the Next Payload field.
       These values are described in section 3.1.


   2.  Place the value zero (0) in the RESERVED field.


   3.  Place the length (in octets) of the payload in the Payload Length
       field.


   4.  Construct the payloads as defined in the remainder of this
       section.


  (omit)


  5.12 Signature Payload Processing


   When creating a Signature Payload, the transmitting entity (initiator
   or responder) MUST do the following:


   1.  Determine the Signature function to be used as defined by the SA
       negotiation.


   2.  Determine the usage of the Signature Data field as defined by the
       DOI.


   3.  Construct a Signature payload.


   4.  Transmit the message to the receiving entity as described in
       section 5.1.


  (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility