NAME

  SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG - [Responder Test] Invalid Signature Payload(Signature Data field value is incorrect) check


TARGET

  SGW


SYNOPSIS

  SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_12_2_2_SIG.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def


INITIALIZATION


TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.

IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; SIG_I ========> <---Signature Data field : 0(invalid)
(6-A) X <======== HDR*; IDir; SIG_R <---Must not transmit or (6-B) <======== HDR*; HASH(1); N/D (HDR; N/D) Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function. The signed data, SIG_I is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I.
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT In the sixth message (6), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.


JUDGEMENT

      The first to the fourth message must be exchanged correctly.
      The fifth message must not be accepted. And the sixth message(6-A) must not be returned
      (* or AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message(6-B) is returned).
      *option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.


TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD


REFERENCE

  RFC2408
  5.12 Signature Payload Processing

(omit)
When a Signature payload is received, the receiving entity (initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine if the Signature is supported. If the Signature determination fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID SIGNATURE INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload containing the INVALID-SIGNATURE message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a system security policy.
2. Perform the Signature function as outlined in the DOI and/or Key Exchange protocol documents. If the Signature function fails, the message is discarded and the following actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID SIGNATURE VALUE, MAY be logged in the appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload containing the AUTHENTICATION-FAILED message type MAY be sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by a system security policy.


SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility