#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_1.seq,v 1.24.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:08 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_1.seq,v 1.24.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:08 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } END{ } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF0 = Link0; my $IF1 = Link1; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '60', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'in', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Transport', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', 'ipsec_p_send_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p_send_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_p_select_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p_select_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p_select_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p_select_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'} = $nonce; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_nonce_i'} = '00000000000000000000000000000001'; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_spi_i'} = '0x00001000'; $ikeConfig{'ipsec_message_id'} = '0000ffff'; vLogHTML("CKY-I: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("CKY-I: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'}
"); vLogHTML("Ni-b: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; vLogHTML("pre_shared key: $ikeConfig{'isakmp_key_value'}
") if $IKE::remote_debug; #====== set other date about this test ======== #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); my %ret = ikePh2PreSeqR($IF0,$cpp,\@ike, \%ikeConfig); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase start ***
"); #====================================================================== #save first cookie my $firstCookie = $ikeConfig{'ph1_responder_cookie'}; vLogHTML("wait 10 seconds
"); sleep(10); $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = 0; my $OPTION_FLAG = 0; #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF0); vClear($IF1); my %ret2 = &IKE::ikePh1Send1st($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp,\@ike, \%ikeConfig); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my %ret = &IKE::ikePh1Recv2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, $ike_ref,\%ret2,\%ikeConfig, \@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my $secondCookie = $ikeConfig{'ph1_responder_cookie'}; if($firstCookie eq $secondCookie){ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("**NG CookieCheck error first:second=$firstCookie:$firstCookie
"); vLogHTML(''); $ret{'status'} = $IKE::FAIL; }else{ if($IKE::payload_check_debug > 0){ vLogHTML(''); vLogHTML("**OK CookieCheck first:second=$firstCookie:$secondCookie
"); vLogHTML(''); } } if($ret{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("cookie field is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF0); vStop($IF1); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_1 - [Responder Test]cookie field check =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html 
  SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
    •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                   |
Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
          |
          |
         SGW-2(TN):initiator
          |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
          |                     
Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                   |
                   |
                  ROUTER-2(TN)
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                   |
Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
          |
          |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
         SGW-1(NUT):responder
          |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
          |
Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                   |
                   | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                  ROUTER-1(TN)
                   |
                   |
Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                   |
                                   |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                 HOST-1(TN)

  • Verification Points
    •     There is no relationship between the two SAs and the initiator 
    and responder cookie pairs SHOULD be different.

  • Configuration

      •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
      • 
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
          
      
          
          
      
            Machine              
            Src              
            Dest              
            Phase I             
            Phase II
          
                   
          
                   
            Ex mode
            Key Value 
            Enc Alg
            Hash Alg           
            Auth Method           
            DH Group           
            PH1 Lt
            IDx
      		
            Proto ID
            Trans ID
            Mode
            Auth Alg
            PH2 Lt
            IDci
            IDcr
            Upper
          
      
          
      
            SGW-1           
            SGW-1 addr           
            SGW-2 addr           
            Main  
            IKE-TEST                               
            3DES           
            SHA           
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            60 sec           
            SGW-1 addr              
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP   
            ESP_3DES             
            Tunnel           
            HMAC-SHA  
            8 Hour           
            Net-v addr          
            Net-z addr   
            any            
          
         
          
         
            SGW-2
            SGW-2 addr
            SGW-1 addr
            Main
            IKE-TEST      
            3DES
            SHA
            pre-shared key           
            2           
            60 sec
            SGW-2 addr    
            PROTO_IPSEC_ESP
            ESP_3DES     
            Tunnel
            HMAC-SHA 
            8 Hour 
            Net-v addr          
            Net-z addr   
            any
          
      
                
        
      
          *Ex Mode = Exchange mode
          *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN  can also be chosen as IDx)
          *IDci = identity payload
          *IDcr = identity payload
          *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
          *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
          *Key Value = pre-shared key value
          *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
          *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
          *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
          *Trans ID = Transform Identifier
          *Mode = Encapsulation Mode
          *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
          *Auth Method = Authentication Method
          *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
          *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
          *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
          *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
          *Net-z = Net-z network address
          *Net-v = Net-v network address
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html 
  This test check is following.


           the first IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>                        <---- Life Time = 60sec


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA          <---- Life Time = 60sec #1 : responder cookie


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE


(5)  HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; HASH_R


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) messages, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the fourth (4) messages, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Send the fifth message from TN
      In the fifth (5) messages, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function). 


   6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
      In the sixth (6) messages, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function(hash function).  


 10sec after the first IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE, 
 negotiation of IKE(the second IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE) is started.


           The second IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA        <---- #2 : responder cookie
                Judgement (Check *1)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
      In this message, initiator cookie is different from the first IDENTITY 
      PROTECTION EXCHANGE's initiator cookie.


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads.
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT In the first IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE, the first to the sixth message must be exchanged correctly. In the second IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE, The first message must be accepted. And 2th message's responder cookie(#2) is not same as the first IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE's responder cookie(#1). =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html 
  RFC2408
  4.3 Security Association Modification


   Security Association modification within ISAKMP is accomplished by
   creating a new SA and initiating communications using that new SA.
   Deletion of the old SA can be done anytime after the new SA is
   established.  Deletion of the old SA is dependent on local security
   policy.  Modification of SAs by using a "Create New SA followed by
   Delete Old SA" method is done to avoid potential vulnerabilities in
   synchronizing modification of existing SA attributes.  The procedure
   for creating new SAs is outlined in section 4.2.  The procedure for
   deleting SAs is outlined in section 5.15.


   Modification of an ISAKMP SA (phase 1 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of an ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship
   between the two SAs and the initiator and responder cookie pairs
   SHOULD be different, as outlined in section 2.5.3.


   Modification of a Protocol SA (phase 2 negotiation) follows the same
   procedure as creation of a Protocol SA. The creation of a new SA is
   protected by the existing ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship between
   the two Protocol SAs.  A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
   the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
   support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
   traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA. As
   stated previously in this section, deletion of an old SA is then
   dependent on local security policy.


   (omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html 
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut