SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_2_2 - [Initiator Test] Using both old and new SA for incoming traffic
SGW
SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_3_2_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
|
|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
|
Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
|
|
ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
|
Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
Verification Points
A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA.
Configuration
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
IDci |
IDcr |
Upper |
| SGW-1 |
SGW-1 addr |
SGW-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-1 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
60 sec |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
| SGW-2 |
SGW-2 addr |
SGW-1 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
60 sec |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode(Aggresive mode can also be chosen as Ex Mode)
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*IDci = identity payload
*IDcr = identity payload
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
*SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
*Net-z = Net-z network address
*Net-v = Net-v network address
This test check is following.
* PHASE I
Either IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE or AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE is performed as a pre sequence.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
AGGRESSIVE EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) NOTE
(1) HDR; SA; KE; => Begin ISAKMP-SA or
Proxy negotiation
NONCE; IDii and Key Exchange
(2) <= HDR; SA; KE;
NONCE; IDir; AUTH
Initiator Identity
Verified by Responder
Key Generated
Basic SA agreed upon
(3) HDR*; AUTH =>
Responder Identity
Verified by Initiator
SA established
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes). There
can be only one Proposal and one Transform offered (i.e. no choices)
in order for the aggressive exchange to work. Keying material used
to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is
used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks are
also transmitted. Random information provided by both parties SHOULD
be used by the authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of
participation in the exchange. Additionally, the initiator transmits
identification information.
2. Recieve the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. Keying material used to arrive at a common
shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee
liveness and protect against replay attacks is also transmitted.
Random information provided by both parties SHOULD be used by the
authentication mechanism to provide shared proof of participation in
the exchange. Additionally, the responder transmits identification
information. All of this information is transmitted under the
protection of the agreed upon authentication function. Local
security policy dictates the action of the responder if no proposed
protection suite is accepted. One possible action is the
transmission of a Notify payload as part of an Informational
Exchange.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator transmits the results of the
agreed upon authentication function. This information is transmitted
under the protection of the common shared secret. Local security
policy dictates the action if an error occurs during these messages.
One possible action is the transmission of a Notify payload as part
of an Informational Exchange.
The test sequence is following.
* PHASE II
the first QUICK MODE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni,IDci, IDcr; ========>
(2) <======== HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, IDci, IDcr;
(3) HDR*, HASH(3) ========>
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
complete message. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
identification information.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator send HASH(3).
HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
the responder's-- minus the payload header.
* PHASE II
the second QUICK MODE is performed after 10sec from establishment of the first IPsec SA(1st QUICK MODE).
the second QUICK MODE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR*, HASH(1),
SA, Ni,IDci, IDcr; ========>
(2) <======== HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr, IDci, IDcr;
(3) HDR*, HASH(3) ========>
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
And initiator send HASH(1) and Nonce. HASH(1) is the prf over the
message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire
message that follows the hash including all payload headers,
but excluding any padding added for encryption. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
identification information.
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads. And responder send HASH(2) and Nonce.
HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
complete message. Nonce is random
information which is used to guarantee liveness. IDci and IDcr is
identification information.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator send HASH(3).
HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
the responder's-- minus the payload header.
* IPsec transmission
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) IP_HDR; ESP*;
ICMP(Echo request) ========> <----This message is sent before the first SA expires.
(2) <======== IP_HDR; ESP*; ICMP(Echo reply)
(3) IP_HDR; ESP*;
ICMP(Echo request) ========>
(4) <======== IP_HDR; ESP*; ICMP(Echo reply)
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), initiator(TN) forward Echo request from HOST-2(TN)
to responder(NUT) using IPsec SA that established by the first QUICK MODE.
And NUT(SGW-1) forward decrypted Echo request to HOST-1(TN).
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), responder(NUT) forward encrypted Echo reply from HOST-1(TN)
to initiator(TN).
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third message (3), initiator(TN) forward Echo request from HOST-2(TN)
to responder(NUT) using IPsec SA that established by the second QUICK MODE.
And NUT(SGW-1) forward decrypted Echo request to HOST-1(TN).
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
In the fourth message (4), responder(NUT) forward encrypted Echo reply from HOST-1(TN)
to initiator(TN).
In Phase I , messages must be exchanged correctly.
In Phase II , the first and the second IPsec SA is established correctly.
In IPsec SA transmission, the first message using the first IPsec SA must be accepted.
And the second message using the second IPsec SA must be returned.
The third message using the second IPsec SA must be accepted.
And the fourth message using the second IPsec SA must be returned.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
4.3 Security Association Modification
Security Association modification within ISAKMP is accomplished by
creating a new SA and initiating communications using that new SA.
Deletion of the old SA can be done anytime after the new SA is
established. Deletion of the old SA is dependent on local security
policy. Modification of SAs by using a "Create New SA followed by
Delete Old SA" method is done to avoid potential vulnerabilities in
synchronizing modification of existing SA attributes. The procedure
for creating new SAs is outlined in section 4.2. The procedure for
deleting SAs is outlined in section 5.15.
Modification of an ISAKMP SA (phase 1 negotiation) follows the same
procedure as creation of an ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship
between the two SAs and the initiator and responder cookie pairs
SHOULD be different, as outlined in section 2.5.3.
Modification of a Protocol SA (phase 2 negotiation) follows the same
procedure as creation of a Protocol SA. The creation of a new SA is
protected by the existing ISAKMP SA. There is no relationship between
the two Protocol SAs. A protocol implementation SHOULD begin using
the newly created SA for outbound traffic and SHOULD continue to
support incoming traffic on the old SA until it is deleted or until
traffic is received under the protection of the newly created SA. As
stated previously in this section, deletion of an old SA is then
dependent on local security policy.
(omit)
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