SG_R_RFC2408_5_8_2_1_ID - [Responder Test] Check the ID type to confirm it is supported
SGW
SG_R_RFC2408_5_8_2_1_ID.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2408_5_8_2_1_ID.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
|
Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
|
|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
|
Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
|
|
ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
|
Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
|
Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
|
| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
|
Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
|
|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
Verification Points
Determine if the Identification Type is supported. This may be
based on the DOI and Situation. If the Identification
determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID ID INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-ID-INFORMATION message type MAY be
sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by
a system security policy.
Configuration
Identification Payload Format(HOST-2:Initiator)
ID Type field : 248 (invalid value)
Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
| Machine |
Src |
Dest |
Phase I |
Phase II |
| Ex mode |
Key Value |
Enc Alg |
Hash Alg |
Auth Method |
DH Group |
PH1 Lt |
IDx |
Proto ID |
Trans ID |
Mode |
Auth Alg |
PH2 Lt |
IDci |
IDcr |
Upper |
| SGW-1 |
SGW-1 addr |
SGW-2 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-1 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
| SGW-2 |
SGW-2 addr |
SGW-1 addr |
Main |
IKE-TEST |
3DES |
SHA |
pre-shared key |
2 |
8 Hour |
SGW-2 addr |
PROTO_IPSEC_ESP |
ESP_3DES |
Tunnel |
HMAC-SHA |
8 Hour |
Net-v addr |
Net-z addr |
any |
*Ex Mode = Exchange mode
*IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx)
*IDci = identity payload
*IDcr = identity payload
*Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm
*Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm
*Key Value = pre-shared key value
*PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime
*PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime
*Proto ID = Protocol Identifier
*Trans ID = Transform Identifier
*Mode = Encapsulation Mode
*Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm
*Auth Method = Authentication Method
*DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group
*Upper = Upper Layer Protocol
*SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address
*SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address
*Net-z = Net-z network address
*Net-v = Net-v network address
This test check is following.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT)
(1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========> <-----ID Type field : 248 (invalid value)
(6-A) X <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R <-----Must not transmit
or
(6-B) <======== HDR*; HASH(1); N/D
(HDR; N/D)
Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN
In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The
Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT
In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN
In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material
used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information
which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN
In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification
information and the results of the agreed upon authentication
function(hash function).
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
In the sixth message (6-B), the responder indicates either an ISAKMP
Notify Payload or an ISAKMP delete Payload.
The first to the fourth message must be exchanged correctly.
The fifth message must not be accepted. And the sixth message(6-A)
must not be returned
(* or INVALID-ID-INFORMATION message(6-B) is returned).
*option : if you want to check the retruned Notify message.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2408
5.8 Identification Payload Processing
(omit)
When an Identification payload is received, the receiving entity
(initiator or responder) MUST do the following:
1. Determine if the Identification Type is supported. This may be
based on the DOI and Situation. If the Identification
determination fails, the message is discarded and the following
actions are taken:
(a) The event, INVALID ID INFORMATION, MAY be logged in the
appropriate system audit file.
(b) An Informational Exchange with a Notification payload
containing the INVALID-ID-INFORMATION message type MAY be
sent to the transmitting entity. This action is dictated by
a system security policy.
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