SG_R_RFC2409_4_8 - [Responder Test]Transform payload SA Attributes check (3DES,SHA,RSA sign,DH2)
SGW
SG_R_RFC2409_4_8.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2409_4_8.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
HOST-2(TN)
|3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
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Net-v --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
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|
SGW-2(TN):initiator
|3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
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Net-w --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
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ROUTER-2(TN)
| 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
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Net-x --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
SGW-1(NUT):responder
|3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
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Net-y --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
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| 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
ROUTER-1(TN)
|
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Net-z -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
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|3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
HOST-1(TN)
| Parameter | Value | |
| ISAKMP | SA Attributes | - 3DES in CBC mode - SHA - RSA signatures. - MODP over group number two. |
| Machine | Src | Dest | Phase I | Phase II | ||||||||||||||
| Ex mode | Key Value | Enc Alg | Hash Alg | Auth Method | DH Group | PH1 Lt | IDx | Proto ID | Trans ID | Mode | Auth Alg | PH2 Lt | IDci | IDcr | Upper | |||
| SGW-1 | SGW-1 addr | SGW-2 addr | Main | 3DES | SHA | RSA signatures | 2 | 8 Hour | SGW-1 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-v addr | Net-z addr | any | |
| SGW-2 | SGW-2 addr | SGW-1 addr | Main | 3DES | SHA | RSA signatures | 2 | 8 Hour | SGW-2 addr | PROTO_IPSEC_ESP | ESP_3DES | Tunnel | HMAC-SHA | 8 Hour | Net-v addr | Net-z addr | any | |
This test check is following.
IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA Judgement (Check *1)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads.
The first message must be accepted. And the second message must be returned.
The second message Attributes(3DES:1,SHA:2,RSA sign:3,DH2:2) must be correct.
And must conform to above Configuration.
Clean up SAD and SPD
RFC2409 4.Introduction
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IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
- DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption; Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA] signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and MODP group number 2. IKE implementations MAY support any additional encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and EC2N groups.
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