#!/usr/bin/perl # # Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Yokogawa Electric Corporation. # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this software in source and binary # forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that # the following conditions and disclaimer are agreed and accepted # by the user: # # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in # the documentation and/or other materials provided with # the distribution. # # 3. Neither the names of the copyrighters, the name of the project # which is related to this software (hereinafter referred to as # "project") nor the names of the contributors may be used to # endorse or promote products derived from this software without # specific prior written permission. # # 4. No merchantable use may be permitted without prior written # notification to the copyrighters. # # 5. The copyrighters, the project and the contributors may prohibit # the use of this software at any time. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT AND # CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING # BUT NOT LIMITED THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE # COPYRIGHTERS, THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # $TAHI: ct/ike/SGW/SG_R_RFC2409_5_1.seq,v 1.29.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:09 ozoe Exp $ # $Id: SG_R_RFC2409_5_1.seq,v 1.29.2.2 2005/11/22 10:06:09 ozoe Exp $ # ###################################################################### BEGIN { } use V6evalTool; use IKE; use IKE_check; my $IF1 = Link1; my $IF0 = Link0; #====== get sequence arguments ====== foreach (@ARGV) { /^test_type=(\S+)/ && do {$TEST_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^support=(\S+)/ && do {$SUPPORT=$1; next; }; /^app_type=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::APP_TYPE=$1; next; }; /^test_phase=(\S+)/ && do {$IKE::TEST_PHASE=$1; next; }; ikeExitError("Unknown sequence option '$_'"); } #====== check NUT type ====== ikeCheckNUT(sgw, $TEST_TYPE, $SUPPORT); #====== Test Configuration ====== %ikeConfig = ( 'app_type' => 'ICMP', 'isakmp_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dport' => '500', 'isakmp_ex_mode' => 'main', 'isakmp_doi' => 'ipsec_doi', 'isakmp_situation' => 'identity_only', 'isakmp_key_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_key_value' => 'IKE-TEST', 'isakmp_enc_alg' => '3des', 'isakmp_hash_alg' => 'sha1', 'isakmp_auth_method' => 'pre_shared_key', 'isakmp_dh_group' => '2', 'isakmp_lt' => '28800', 'isakmp_lt_unit' => 'seconds', 'isakmp_src_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'isakmp_dst_id_type' => 'address', 'isakmp_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'isakmp_num_pro' => '1', 'isakmp_num_trans' => '1', 'ipsec_id_type' => 'address', 'ipsec_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_dst_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET4_ADDR}", 'ipsec_src_id' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NET0_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tdst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_tsrc' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_NUT_NET2_SGW1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_dst' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET4_HOST2_ADDR}", 'ipsec_end_src' => "$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET0_HOST1_ADDR}", 'ipsec_supper' => 'any', 'ipsec_dupper' => 'any', 'ipsec_direction' => 'in', 'ipsec_pfs_group' => 'off', 'ipsec_p_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_proto' => 'PROTO_IPSEC_ESP', 'ipsec_p1_t_num' => '1', 'ipsec_p1_t1_enc_alg' => 'ESP_3DES', 'ipsec_p1_t1_auth_mtd' => 'HMAC_SHA', 'ipsec_p1_t1_mode' => 'Tunnel', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt' => '8', 'ipsec_p1_t1_lt_unit' => 'hour', ); #====== set TN's cookie ======== my $cookie = GetMD5("$IKE::IKEAddr{IKE_TN_NET3_SGW2_ADDR}"."$ikeConfig{'isakmp_dport'}".time()); $cookie = substr($cookie, 0, 16); my $nonce = '00000000000000000000000000000000'; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_cookie_i'} = $cookie; $ikeConfig{'isakmp_nonce_i'} = $nonce; #====== set other date about this test ======== #====== set ISAKMP SA, IPSEC SPD #====== vLogHTML("*** Target IKE initialization phase ***
"); ikeInit(%ikeConfig); #====== set Address of NUT ====== vLogHTML("*** Target initialization phase ***
"); vCapture($IF0); vCapture($IF1); ikeSetAddr($IF0,$IF1,$IKE::address_debug); #====== set ISAKMP SA packet frame, parameter #====== my $cpp = undef; my @ike = (); #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target testing phase ***
"); #====================================================================== #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 1st message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); my %ret1 = ikePh1Send1st($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ikeConfig); if($ret1{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 2nd message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- my @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(1) + shiftFlag(2) + shiftFlag(3); my $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'SAAttributeCheck'} + $IKE_check::optionHash{'phase1OrderCheck'}; my %ret2 = ikePh1Recv2nd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret1, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret2{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 3rd message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); my %ret3 = ikePh1Send3rd($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret2, \%ikeConfig); if($ret3{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @ike = (); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 4th message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(4) + shiftFlag(10); #none $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'none'}; my %ret4 = ikePh1Recv4th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret3, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret4{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } my @ike = (); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 5th message send ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- vClear($IF1); vClear($IF0); my %ret5 = ikePh1Send5th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret4, \%ikeConfig); if($ret5{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("*** Phase-1 6th message receive ***
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- @CHECK_FLAG = undef; $CHECK_FLAG[0] = shiftFlag(5) + shiftFlag(8); #ID payload $OPTION_FLAG = $IKE_check::optionHash{'isakmpEncryptionCheck'} + $IKE_check::optionHash{'Phase1HashCheck'}; my %ret6 = ikePh1Recv6th($IF0, 5, 0, 0, $cpp, \@ike, \%ret5, \%ikeConfig,\@CHECK_FLAG,$OPTION_FLAG); if($ret6{'status'} == $IKE::FAIL) { ikeReset(); exit($V6evalTool::exitFail); } #------------------------------------------------------------------- vLogHTML("Implementation of Main Mode with pre-shared key is correct
"); #------------------------------------------------------------------- #====================================================================== vLogHTML("*** Target test finish ***
"); #====================================================================== vStop($IF1); vStop($IF0); ikeReset(); ikeExitPass(); #NOTREACHED ###################################################################### __END__ =head1 NAME SG_R_RFC2409_5_1 - [Responder Test]Implementation of Main Mode with pre-shared key check =head1 TARGET SGW =head1 SYNOPSIS =begin html
  SG_R_RFC2409_5_1.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2409_5_1.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def
=end html =head1 INITIALIZATION =begin html
  • Network Topology
  •                                  HOST-2(TN)
                                       |3ffe:501:ffff:104::11
                                       |
    Net-v   --+------------------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:104::/64
              |
              |
             SGW-2(TN):initiator
              |3ffe:501:ffff:103::11
              |                     
    Net-w   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:103::/64
                       |
                       |
                      ROUTER-2(TN)
                       | 3ffe:501:ffff:102::11
                       |
    Net-x   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:102::/64
              |
              |3ffe:501:ffff:102::1
             SGW-1(NUT):responder
              |3ffe:501:ffff:101::1
              |
    Net-y   --+--------+------------------------ 3ffe:501:ffff:101::/64
                       |
                       | 3ffe:501:ffff:101::11
                      ROUTER-1(TN)
                       |
                       |
    Net-z   -----------+---------------+-------- 3ffe:501:ffff:100::/64
                                       |
                                       |3ffe:501:ffff:100::13
                                     HOST-1(TN)
      

  • Verification Points
  •     Implementation of Main Mode with pre-shared key check.
    	

  • Configuration
    •        
    • Initiator and Responder IKE parameter
    • At least, following parameter must be included in proposal.
      Machine Src Dest Phase I Phase II
      Ex mode Key Value Enc Alg Hash Alg Auth Method DH Group PH1 Lt IDx

      Proto ID Trans ID Mode Auth Alg PH2 Lt IDci IDcr Upper
      SGW-1 SGW-1 addr SGW-2 addr Main IKE-TEST 3DES SHA pre-shared key 2 8 Hour SGW-1 addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Tunnel HMAC-SHA 8 Hour Net-v addr Net-z addr any
      SGW-2 SGW-2 addr SGW-1 addr Main IKE-TEST 3DES SHA pre-shared key 2 8 Hour SGW-2 addr PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ESP_3DES Tunnel HMAC-SHA 8 Hour Net-v addr Net-z addr any
      *Ex Mode = Exchange mode *IDx = identity payload(FQDN or user FQDN can also be chosen as IDx) *IDci = identity payload *IDcr = identity payload *Enc Alg = IKE Encryption Algorithm *Hash Alg = IKE Authentication Algorithm *Key Value = pre-shared key value *PH1 Lt = Phase-1 Lifetime *PH2 Lt = Phase-2 Lifetime *Proto ID = Protocol Identifier *Trans ID = Transform Identifier *Mode = Encapsulation Mode *Auth Alg = Authentication Algorithm *Auth Method = Authentication Method *DH Group = Diffie-Hellman Group *Upper = Upper Layer Protocol *SGW-1 addr = SGW-1 address *SGW-2 addr = SGW-2 address *Net-z = Net-z network address *Net-v = Net-v network address
=end html =head1 TEST PROCEDURE =begin html
  This test check is following.

IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE
# Initiator(TN) Direction Responder(NUT) (1) HDR; SA ========>
(2) <======== HDR; SA Judgement (Check *1)
(3) HDR; KE; NONCE ========>
(4) <======== HDR; KE; NONCE Judgement (Check *2)
(5) HDR*; IDii; HASH_I ========>
(6) <======== HDR*; IDir; HASH_R Judgement (Check *3)
1. Send the first message from TN In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation. The Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).
2. Receive the second message from NUT In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads.
3. Send the third message from TN In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
4. Receive the fourth message from NUT In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.
5. Send the fifth message from TN In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
6. Receive the sixth message from NUT In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification information and the results of the agreed upon authentication function(hash function).
=end html =head1 JUDGEMENT The first to the sixth message must be exchanged correctly. Check *1 Security Association Payload Format must be base on description of RFC. Check *2 Key Exchange and Nonce Payload Format must be base on description of RFC. Check *3 Identification and Hash Payload Format must be base on description of RFC. And must conform to above Configuration. =head1 TERMINATION Clean up SAD and SPD =head1 REFERENCE =begin html
  RFC2409 
  4. Introduction

(omit)
IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
- DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.
- MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].
- Authentication via pre-shared keys.
- MODP over default group number one (see below).
(omit)
5. Exchanges
There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key exchange: Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode MUST be implemented; Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In addition, Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In addition, New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.
(omit)
=end html =head1 SEE ALSO perldoc V6evalTool =begin html
  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility
=end html =cut