NAME

  SG_R_RFC2409_5_2 - [Responder Test]Implementation of Main Mode with RSA signatures check

TARGET

  SGW

SYNOPSIS

  SG_R_RFC2409_5_2.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt SG_R_RFC2409_5_2.def -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See also ike_common.def and ike_ipsec.def and ike_addr.def and ike_pkt_ph1_recv.def and ike_pkt_ph2_recv.def

INITIALIZATION

TEST PROCEDURE

  This test check is following.


           IDENTITY PROTECTION EXCHANGE


 #   Initiator(TN)     Direction      Responder(NUT)
(1)  HDR; SA            ========>


(2)                     <========       HDR; SA
                Judgement (Check *1)


(3)  HDR; KE; NONCE     ========>


(4)                     <========     HDR; KE; NONCE
                Judgement (Check *2)


(5)  HDR*; IDii; SIG_I  ========>


(6)                     <========     HDR*; IDir; SIG_R
                Judgement (Check *3)


   1. Send the first message from TN
      In the first message (1), the initiator generates a proposal it
      considers adequate to protect traffic for the given situation.  The
      Security Association, Proposal, and Transform payloads are included
      in the Security Association payload (for notation purposes).


   2. Receive the second message from NUT
      In the second message (2), the responder indicates the protection
      suite it has accepted with the Security Association, Proposal, and
      Transform payloads. 


   3. Send the third message from TN
      In the third (3) message, the initiator send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   4. Receive the fourth message from NUT
      In the fourth (4) message, the responder send keying material 
      used to arrive at a common shared secret and random information 
      which is used to guarantee liveness and protect against replay attacks.


   5. Send the fifth message from TN
      In the fifth (5) message, the initiator send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_I is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I.


   6. Receive the sixth message from NUT
      In the sixth (6) message, the responder send identification 
      information and the results of the agreed upon authentication 
      function. The signed data, SIG_R is the result of the negotiated 
      digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_R.

JUDGEMENT

        The first to the sixth message must be exchanged correctly.
           Check *1 
               Security Association Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
           Check *2
               Key Exchange and Nonce Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
           Check *3
               Identification and Signature Payload Format must be base on description of RFC.
        And must conform to above Configuration.

TERMINATION

  Clean up SAD and SPD

REFERENCE

  RFC2409
  4. Introduction


   (omit)


     IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:


      - DES [DES] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check
      (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch96] and listed in
      Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.


      - MD5 [MD5] and SHA [SHA].


      - Authentication via pre-shared keys.


      - MODP over default group number one (see below).


   In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption;
   Tiger ([TIGER]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [RSA]
   signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and
   MODP group number 2.  IKE implementations MAY support any additional
   encryption algorithms defined in Appendix A and MAY support ECP and
   EC2N groups.


   (omit)


  5. Exchanges


   There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key
   exchange: Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated
   keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode
   MUST be implemented; Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In
   addition, Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate
   fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In
   addition, New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to
   define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations
   MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.


   (omit)

SEE ALSO

  perldoc V6evalTool

  IKE.html IKE Test Common Utility